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Password Protected? 
Can a Password Save Your Cell Phone 
from a Search Incident to Arrest? 
Adam M. Gershowitz 
ABSTRACT: Over the last few years, dozens of courts have authorized police 
to conduct warrantless searches of cell phones when arresting individuals. 
Under the “search incident to arrest” doctrine, police are free to search text 
messages, call histories, photos, voicemails, and a host of other data if they 
arrest an individual and remove a cell phone from his pocket. Given that 
courts have offered little protection against cell-phone searches, this Article 
explores whether individuals can protect themselves by password protecting 
their phones. The Article concludes, unfortunately, that password protecting 
a cell phone offers minimal legal protection when an individual is lawfully 
searched incident to arrest. In conducting such a search, police may attempt 
to hack or bypass a password. Because cell phones are often found in 
arrestees’ pockets, police may take the phones to the police station, where 
computer-savvy officers will have the time and technology to unlock a 
phone’s contents. And if police are unable to decipher the password, they 
may request or even demand that an arrestee turn over his password, 
without any significant risk of suppression of evidence found on the phone 
under the Miranda doctrine or the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination 
Clause. In short, while password protecting a cell phone may make it more 
challenging for police to find evidence, the password itself offers very little 
legal protection to arrestees. Accordingly, legislative or judicial action is 
needed to narrow the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine with respect to cell 
phones. 
 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1128 
 II. THE SEARCH-INCIDENT-TO-ARREST DOCTRINE ................................... 1131 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, cell-phone use has exploded. Most Americans now 
use cell phones capable of containing huge amounts of information, such as 
pictures, documents, music, text messages, and e-mails.1 Not surprisingly, 
the fact that cell phones are carried in public and hold enormous amounts 
of data has made them attractive targets for law enforcement. Numerous 
defendants have been convicted of drug dealing2 and child pornography 
based on evidence found on cell phones.3 
In an earlier article, I explained how, under the search-incident-to-
arrest doctrine, police can conduct warrantless searches of cell phones when 
they arrest suspects for practically any offense.4 So long as police have a valid 
reason to arrest a suspect, and in the course of doing so find a cell phone on 
his person or immediately nearby, the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine 
permits police to search the arrestee’s phone, even if there is no reason to 
believe the phone contains evidence related to the arrest.5 The only 
significant restriction on the search of cell phones incident to arrest is that 
the search must be conducted close in time to the arrest—i.e., 
“contemporaneously” with the arrest.6 
 
 1. See Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27, 
41 (2008). 
 2. See, e.g., United States v. Fuentes, 368 F. App’x 95, 98–99 (11th Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam) (rejecting an argument to suppress contact information appearing in the cell phone of 
a drug dealer); United States v. Young, 278 F. App’x 242 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) 
(affirming reliance on a cell phone’s text messages to convict a defendant of heroin 
distribution and sentence him to 420 months incarceration); United States v. Wurie, 612 F. 
Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2009) (upholding a conviction for intent to distribute crack based on 
call-log information on a cell phone); United States v. Santillan, 571 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (D. Ariz. 
2008) (relying on a cell phone’s call history to link a defendant to a marijuana distribution 
ring); United States v. Valdez, No. 06-CR-336, 2008 WL 360548 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 8, 2008) 
(denying motion to suppress use of a cell phone address book and call history to demonstrate 
that the defendant had been in contact with others in a drug conspiracy); People v. Shepard, 
No. H032876, 2008 WL 4824083, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2008) (upholding conviction 
where police officer “looked at the text messages in the cell phone because he knew that ‘cell 
phones are used to facilitate drug transactions’”); People v. Diaz, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215 (Ct. App. 
2008) (upholding a drug conviction based on a text message stating “6 4 80,” which referred to 
the sale of six ecstacy pills for eighty dollars). 
 3. See, e.g., Brady v. Gonzalez, No. 08 C 5916, 2009 WL 1952774 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 2009) 
(finding a picture of a nude child on a cell phone); United States v. McCray, No. CR408-231, 
2009 WL 29607 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 5, 2009) (denying suppression of child pornography found on a 
cell phone); Lemons v. State, 298 S.W.3d 658 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) (rejecting effort to suppress 
pornographic picture of fourteen-year old girl found on a cell phone). 
 4. Gershowitz, supra note 1. 
 5. See id. at 44. 
 6. See id. at 39. 
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Although it is far from a routine practice, the number of cell-phone 
searches incident to arrest has recently risen dramatically.7 Over the last few 
years, more than forty courts have been called on to assess the 
constitutionality of searching cell phones incident to arrest; and the vast 
majority of those courts have approved the practice.8 
With so little judicial protection against warrantless cell-phone searches, 
this Article explores whether individuals can protect their cell-phone data by 
password protecting their phones. The value of password protecting the 
phone depends on the answer to three crucial questions. First, when police 
arrest a suspect and encounter a password-protected phone, can they 
attempt to break the password themselves and unlock the phone without the 
consent of the arrestee and without a search warrant? Second, how long can 
police tinker with the phone in an effort to gain access to its contents? And 
third, if police cannot crack the password on their own, can they request or 
even demand that the arrestee turn over the password without violating the 
Miranda doctrine or the Fifth Amendment protection against self 
incrimination? 
The first question is relatively straightforward, as set forth in Part II, 
which reviews the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine and examines caselaw 
predating the Internet9 that permits police to break into and search 
containers incident to arrest.10 Courts have regularly upheld searches where 
police have unlocked or broken into locked glove compartments, briefcases, 
and even safes during searches incident to arrest.11 Accordingly, there is a 
strong argument that, incident to a lawful arrest, police should be permitted 
to unlock the cell phone so long as they can figure out the password in a 
short period of time following arrest. This should be disconcerting to the 
millions of Americans who use simplistic passwords (such as “1234” or their 
birthday)12 that police can easily guess. And it should be particularly 
 
 7. See infra notes 62–66 and accompanying text (recounting the growing number of cases 
where police have searched cell phones incident to arrest as well as under the automobile 
exception, inventory exception, exigency exception, and pursuant to consent). 
 8. See infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 9. Professor Orin Kerr has made a compelling argument that courts should seek a 
“technology-neutral” translation of Fourth Amendment issues to the Internet. See Orin S. Kerr, 
Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1007 
(2010). 
 10. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 11. See infra notes 128–35 and accompanying text. 
 12. See Ashlee Vance, If Your Password’s Still 123456, It Might as Well Be HackMe, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 21, 2010, at A1 (explaining that the most popular password is “123456” and that “one out 
of five Web users still decides to leave the digital equivalent of a key under the doormat: they 
choose a simple, easily guessed password like ‘abc123,’ ‘iloveyou’ or even ‘password’ to protect 
their data” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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worrisome to iPhone users, whose devices have weak password-protection 
functions that are vulnerable to tampering.13 
The second question—how long police can take in an effort to decipher 
or bypass the password?—is more complicated. Part III addresses this 
question. In an “ordinary” search incident to arrest, officers must conduct 
the search contemporaneously to arrest. Although there is no fixed time 
limit, courts require police to conduct such searches as soon as practicable, 
and judges rarely tolerate lengthy, drawn-out searches. This limitation is 
deceiving, however, in the context of cell-phone searches. U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent provides that when police search for an item associated 
with the person of an arrestee, such as his clothing or wallet, they can take 
far longer to conduct the search and can comfortably do so at the station 
house, rather than at the scene of the arrest. When a cell phone is found in 
an arrestee’s pocket or attached to his belt, a compelling argument exists 
that the phone is associated with the arrestee’s person and thus that the 
police have hours to try to break the password—including by use of 
computer-hacking software at the police station. 
The final question—whether police can ask or demand that an arrestee 
reveal or enter his password—also demonstrates how little protection 
arrestees have in the information contained in their cell phones. In most 
cases, before requesting a cell-phone password, police should be obligated 
to read the arrestee his Miranda rights.14 Yet, failure to read the warnings 
will not result in suppression of any illegal evidence found on the cell phone 
because the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine never applies to Miranda 
violations.15 
If police demanded (rather than requested) that an arrestee disclose his 
password, the arrestee would have only a very weak argument that the police 
have compelled a testimonial response in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause. Moreover, even if the self-
incrimination privilege theoretically existed in this context, few criminal 
defendants would be savvy enough to invoke the protection. And innocent 
individuals who have nothing illegal on their phones (and thus no evidence 
to suppress) will be unable to bring civil-rights lawsuits because recent 
Supreme Court caselaw limits Fifth Amendment remedies to “criminal 
cases,” and is not applicable to situations where the police find no evidence 
and the arrestee is not charged.16 Part IV discusses these Fifth Amendment 
implications for police requests or demands for the password to an arrestee’s 
phone. 
 
 13. See infra notes 197–200 and accompanying text (describing how the iPhone’s 
password-protection function is much less sophisticated than that of some other smart phones). 
 14. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 15. See infra note 214 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 243–48 and accompanying text. 
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This Article paints a grim picture of the privacy of arrestees’ cell 
phones. Police have wide authority to search phones incident to arrest, even 
if the arrest has nothing to do with the phone itself and even if the phone is 
password-protected. Because cell phones are typically found on an arrestee’s 
person, Supreme Court precedent seemingly gives police authority to spend 
hours trying to crack the password at the scene or in the comfort of the 
police station. Additionally, because many Americans choose overly 
simplistic passwords and certain cell phones are easily hacked, there is a 
chance that police can break into the phone without any help from the 
arrestee. If police request the password from the arrestee, the Miranda 
doctrine provides only nominal protection because defendants rarely invoke 
it and police violation of the rule does not result in the suppression of 
evidence. Only if police demand that an arrestee provide his password can 
he make out a plausible (though still debatable) Fifth Amendment claim. 
Because even password protecting a cell phone does not provide a 
significant roadblock to a police search of the phone incident to arrest, this 
Article concludes that there is a strong need for judicial or legislative 
intervention to curb the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine for cell-phone 
searches. 
II. THE SEARCH-INCIDENT-TO-ARREST DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court has recognized a host of scenarios in which police 
can search people or places without a warrant.17 Perhaps the most common 
exception police invoke is the search-incident-to-arrest exception.18 Under 
this exception, police are authorized to search the person and his 
immediate “grabbing space” to protect against physical danger and to 
prevent the destruction of evidence. In doing so, police can search in any 
area or container near the arrestee, including a pocket, a purse, and even a 
wallet. In Part II.A below, I briefly review five key Supreme Court cases that 
establish the broad contours of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine. Part 
II.B then discusses the dozens of lower-court decisions that have applied the 
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine to cell phones. Thereafter, Part II.C 
provides a big-picture overview of the rules and standards for searching cell 
phones incident to arrest and looks at how the Supreme Court, legislatures, 
and individual cell-phone users may shape the law in the coming years. 
 
 17. See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473–
74 (1985) (listing “over twenty exceptions to the probable cause or the warrant requirement or 
both”); see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582–83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (noting that at least two more exceptions to the warrant requirement have been 
added since Professor Bradley’s article). 
 18. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
§ 5.2(b), at 99 (4th ed. 2004) (describing the search incident to arrest as probably the most 
common type of police search). 
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A. THE SUPREME COURT’S “STANDARD” SEARCH-INCIDENT-TO-ARREST DOCTRINE 
Although it is not the earliest search-incident-to-arrest case,19 the 
starting point for today’s broad search-incident-to-arrest doctrine is the 
Supreme Court’s 1969 decision in Chimel v. California.20 In Chimel, the Court 
suppressed evidence police found when they searched Chimel’s entire 
home, including his attic and garage, following his arrest for burglary.21 
Despite suppressing the evidence, the Chimel decision provided broad 
authority for the police to search incident to arrest. The Court held that, 
contemporaneous with a lawful arrest, police could search for weapons that 
an arrestee could use against the arresting officer and to prevent an arrestee 
from concealing or destroying evidence.22 The Court limited the scope of 
this search to the arrestee’s person and the area within his immediate 
control.23 Thus, while police could not rummage through Chimel’s entire 
house following his arrest, they were free to search anywhere on his person 
or within his immediate grabbing space. 
A few years after Chimel, in United States v. Robinson, the Court moved a 
step further and clarified that police could open closed containers when 
searching incident to arrest.24 Police arrested Robinson for operating a 
motor vehicle with a revoked license.25 During a search incident to arrest of 
Robinson’s person, the arresting officer felt an object in Robinson’s coat 
pocket but was unsure of what it was.26 The officer reached into the pocket 
and pulled out a “crumpled up cigarette package.”27 Still unsure what was in 
the package, the officer opened it and discovered capsules of heroin.28 Even 
though Robinson was not initially arrested for a drug crime and the officer 
had no reason to believe the package in his pocket contained drugs, the 
Supreme Court upheld the search.29 The Court announced a bright-line 
rule for searches incident to arrest, permitting police officers to open and 
search through all items on an arrestee’s person, even if they are in a closed 
container, and even without suspicion that the contents of the container are 
 
 19. For a discussion of the earlier search-incident-to-arrest cases, see James J. Tomkovicz, 
Divining and Designing the Future of the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine: Avoiding Instability, 
Irrationality, and Infidelity, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1422 (tracing the history of the doctrine 
from Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 
(1925)). 
 20. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
 21. Id. at 754. 
 22. Id. at 763. 
 23. See id. 
 24. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 25. Id. at 220. 
 26. Id. at 223. 
 27. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 236. 
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illegal.30 Put differently, the Court in Robinson clarified that the search-
incident-to-arrest doctrine is automatic, and that courts should not conduct 
a case-by-case inquiry to determine whether police were actually suspicious 
or whether the search was truly necessary to protect the officer or prevent 
the destruction of evidence.31 
In its next series of important search-incident-to-arrest decisions, the 
Supreme Court turned its attention to automobiles. In New York v. Belton, the 
Court expanded its bright-line rule to permit searches incident to arrest of 
the entire interior of automobiles (although not the trunk) following a valid 
arrest.32 In Belton, the officer stopped a car for speeding and, upon smelling 
marijuana, arrested the occupants.33 With the occupants safely removed 
from the vehicle, the officer then searched the passenger compartment of 
the car and found a jacket in the backseat.34 The officer unzipped the 
pockets of the jacket and found cocaine.35 In upholding the search of the 
jacket, the Court explained the value of “a straightforward rule, easily 
applied, and predictably enforced.”36 To make matters simple and 
predictable, the Court permitted police, following a lawful arrest, to search 
the entire passenger compartment of a vehicle and to open any container 
inside the vehicle, regardless of whether it could possibly contain a weapon 
or evidence of a crime.37 
In 2004, the Court expanded police authority to search vehicles by 
authorizing the search incident to arrest of vehicles that were recently used 
by an arrestee.38 In Thornton, police arrested Thornton for drug possession 
after he parked his vehicle and walked away from it.39 After handcuffing 
Thornton, the officer walked over to Thornton’s vehicle, searched the 
passenger compartment, and found a handgun that was later used to 
support a charge of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking 
crime.40 The Court upheld the search and thus expanded the search-
incident-to-arrest doctrine to permit a search of the passenger compartment 
of a vehicle if the arrestee recently occupied it.41 
 
 30. Id. at 235–36. 
 31. See id. at 235. 
 32. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
 33. Id. at 455–56. 
 34. Id. at 456. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 459. 
 37. See id. at 460–61. The Court did not clarify in Belton, nor has it in any subsequent 
cases, whether locked containers in an automobile can be opened incident to arrest. 
 38. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004). 
 39. Id. at 617–18. 
 40. Id. at 618–19. 
 41. Id. at 622–24. 
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While the decision in Thornton expanded the search-incident-to-arrest 
doctrine, it raised the ire of Justice Scalia, who concurred in the judgment 
only and maintained that the Court had stretched the doctrine “beyond its 
breaking point.”42 Justice Scalia argued that the search-incident-to-arrest 
doctrine should be scaled back to allow searches of the passenger 
compartment of a vehicle only when “it is reasonable to believe evidence 
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”43 
Only a few years later in Arizona v. Gant,44 a majority of the Court 
partially embraced Justice Scalia’s position. In Gant, police arrested the 
defendant for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed him, and placed 
him in the back of a police car.45 Thereafter, police searched Gant’s vehicle 
and found a jacket in the backseat that contained cocaine.46 Under Belton, 
the Court should have upheld the search of Gant’s vehicle and the jacket in 
the backseat. The Court instead used Gant as an opportunity to significantly 
narrow the Belton decision and the scope of police authority to search 
vehicles incident to arrest. First, the Court held that police can only search a 
vehicle to protect their safety if “the arrestee is unsecured and within 
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the 
search.”47 Second, the Court adopted Justice Scalia’s position from Thornton 
and held that police can search the passenger compartment of a vehicle 
incident to arrest “when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the 
crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’”48 
While the Gant decision is clearly an effort to narrow the search-
incident-to-arrest doctrine, it is debatable how much change it will foster. 
On the one hand, in cases like Gant’s where the arrestee is already 
handcuffed and the reason for the arrest was a traffic infraction (for which 
no evidence could be found in the vehicle), a search of the vehicle is 
impermissible. On the other hand, many traffic stops immediately produce 
some evidence of other illegal activity (such as the odor of drugs in the 
vehicle)49 that will authorize a search under Gant.50 Thus, while some 
vehicle searches incident to arrest are now prohibited under Gant, it is not 
 
 42. Id. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 43. Id. at 632. 
 44. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). 
 45. Id. at 1714. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 1719. 
 48. Id. (quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
 49. For example, we need look no further than the Court’s decision in Belton itself, where 
the initial traffic stop led to an officer smelling marijuana. See supra note 33 and accompanying 
text. 
 50. Moreover, in a likely small number of cases, police who desire to search a vehicle 
incident to arrest may be willing to take a safety risk and begin to search while the arrestee is 
still within grabbing distance of the vehicle. 
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yet clear just how many fewer searches will occur51 or whether, in the next 
few years, the Supreme Court will expand Gant to restrict nonvehicle 
searches incident to arrest, such as the cigarette pack in Robinson.52 
*     *     * 
While many questions remain unanswered after the Court’s 2009 
decision in Gant and while that decision may ultimately lead to a significant 
narrowing of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, at present, the doctrine 
continues to give law enforcement enormous power. Incident to an arrest, 
police may search the person of an arrestee and his immediate grabbing 
space. In many instances, police can search the passenger compartment of 
an arrestee’s vehicle. And when conducting searches incident to arrest of 
persons, their grabbing space, and their vehicles, police are permitted to 
open and search containers. It is this broad authority that arguably gives 
police the power to search cell phones incident to arrest. 
B. SEARCHING CELL PHONES INCIDENT TO ARREST 
As wireless technology has become ubiquitous, courts have been called 
on to apply the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine to digital devices. The first 
such cases appeared in the mid-1990s and involved very simple pagers and 
beepers that stored only phone numbers and short messages. Courts 
universally upheld the search incident to arrest of such devices. For 
example, in United States v. Chan, police activated a pager and retrieved 
telephone numbers that linked Chan to a drug ring.53 The federal court 
upheld the search of Chan’s pager because it considered a pager an 
electronic container, and Supreme Court precedent authorized the search 
of containers incident to arrest.54 The court further explained that it was 
irrelevant that the arrestee could not retrieve a weapon from the pager or 
plausibly destroy any evidence from the pager.55 Put simply, the court 
embraced the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine’s bright-line rule for wireless 
technology and saw no reason to distinguish pagers from traditional 
searches of luggage, boxes, and other containers. In the years after Chan, 
half a dozen other courts upheld similar searches of pagers.56 
 
 51. One possibility is that police will reduce the number of searches incident to arrest and 
instead attempt to acquire evidence by impounding the vehicles and conducting inventories. 
 52. See Matthew E. Orso, Cellular Phones, Warrantless Searches, and the New Frontier of Fourth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 183, 209 (2010) (discussing the possibility of 
Gant’s extension beyond automobiles); see also infra note 89 (discussing two cases where courts 
have refused to permit searches of cell phones incident to arrest because no evidence related to 
the suspect’s original crime could be found on the phone). 
 53. 830 F. Supp. 531, 533 (N.D. Cal. 1993). 
 54. Id. at 534–35. 
 55. Id. at 535–36. 
 56. United States v. Hunter, No. 96-4259, 1998 WL 887289, at *3 (4th Cir. Oct. 29, 1998) 
(per curiam) (upholding retrieval of telephone numbers from a pager); United States v. Ortiz, 
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1. The Vast Majority of Lower Court Cases Have Upheld 
the Search Incident to Arrest of Cell Phones 
In the years following the Chan decision, cell-phone use increased 
dramatically in the United States. Early-generation cell phones were not 
markedly different than pagers, but they did contain additional data such as 
outgoing call logs and text messages. Law-enforcement officers quickly 
recognized that drug dealers could use cell phones to text their drug 
transactions without having to speak on the phone.57 Accordingly, police 
began to search cell phones incident to arrest, and, beginning in the mid-
2000s, courts were called on to assess the constitutionality of such searches. 
Although it is impossible to know how many times police have searched 
cell phones incident to arrest in recent years, the number is likely in the 
thousands.58 In many instances, police likely found no incriminating 
evidence,59 and, in cases where police did find evidence related to a crime, 
defendants likely pled guilty without challenging the constitutionality of the 
searches.60 Nevertheless, more than fifty defendants have challenged the 
warrantless search of early-generation cell phones over the last few years.61 
In a handful of cases, courts have addressed whether these warrantless 
searches were permissible under the automobile exception,62 the inventory 
 
84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Stroud, No. 93-30445, 1994 WL 
711908, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 1994) (same); United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 
1222–23 (11th Cir. 1993) (inserting batteries and reactivating beeper so that it may be called 
after arrest is permissible); United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818, 833–34 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(upholding retrieval of telephone numbers from a pager); United States v. Lynch, 908 F. Supp. 
284, 287–89 (D.V.I. 1995) (same). 
 57. See, e.g., People v. Shepard, No. H032876, 2008 WL 4824083, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Nov. 7, 2008) (quoting detective who testified that he “looked at the text messages in the cell 
phone because he knew that ‘cell phones are used to facilitate drug transactions, and that’s via 
text messages’”). 
 58. See United States v. Chappell, Crim. No. 09-139 (JNE/JJK), 2010 WL 1131474, at *4 
(D. Minn. Jan. 12, 2010) (rejecting claim that cell phone could be searched under inventory 
exception and noting testimony of police officer that “it was his understanding that he could 
inspect anything on the cellular phone without a warrant until the completion of the booking 
process”), adopted by 2010 WL 1131473 (D. Minn. Mar. 22, 2010); United States v. Wall, No. 08-
60016-CR, 2008 WL 5381412, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2008) (noting that a drug-enforcement 
agent testified during a suppression hearing that “it is his practice to search cell phones for text 
messages primarily because DEA’s policy allows for it and because it is common to find text 
messages that further the investigation”), aff’d, 343 F. App’x 564 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
 59. See, e.g., Scott J. Upright, Note, Suspicionless Border Seizures of Electronic Files: The 
Overextension of the Border Search Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 291, 
292 & n.6 (2009) (noting how customs officials repeatedly searched and seized the cell phone 
of a Muslim firefighter whenever he reentered the United States). 
 60. See Gershowitz, supra note 1, at 40 n.84. 
 61. See infra notes 62–66. 
 62. The automobile exception allows police to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle 
provided they have probable cause to believe evidence will be found in the vehicle. See, e.g., 
United States v. Monson-Perez, No. 4:09CR623 HEA, 2010 WL 889833, at *6–7 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 
8, 2010) (concluding there was probable cause to search cell phone and allowing warrantless 
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exception,63 the exigency exception,64 or based on consent.65 However, 
courts have decided the bulk of warrantless cell-phone search cases under 
the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, and they have upheld the searches in 
the vast majority of cases.66 
 
search under automobile exception); United States v. Rocha, No. 06-40057-01-RDR, 2008 WL 
4498950, at *6 (D. Kan. Oct. 2, 2008) (finding probable cause to search cell phone for drug 
activity and relying on automobile exception); United States v. James, No. 1:06CR134CDP, 
2008 WL 1925032, at *7 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2008) (upholding search of cell phone’s call log 
based on automobile exception); United States v. Fierros-Alvarez, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1211–
14 (D. Kan. 2008) (upholding search of cell phone located in vehicle under the automobile 
exception because inventory of vehicle turned up drugs and there was probable cause to believe 
the cell phone had facilitated drug transactions); People v. Chho, No. H034693, 2010 WL 
1952659, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. May 17, 2010) (upholding search of text messages on repeatedly 
ringing cell phone under automobile exception); State v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 1090 (Conn. 
2010) (upholding search of cell phone under automobile exception), cert. denied, No. 10-7287 
(U.S. Feb. 22, 2011); State v. Novicky, No. A07-0170, 2008 WL 1747805, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Apr. 15, 2008) (upholding search of cell phone seized from an automobile when search was 
conducted on the day of trial). 
 63. The inventory exception allows an administrative cataloging of items found in an 
impounded vehicle, thus making it possible to find a cell phone, but difficult to justify 
searching its contents. See Chappell, 2010 WL 1131474, at *14 (rejecting Government’s 
contention that search of cell phone during the booking process was permissible under the 
inventory exception); Wall, 2008 WL 5381412, at *3 (same). 
 64. Exigency searches authorize warrantless police activity to prevent the destruction of 
evidence, escape of suspects, or to deal with danger to the suspect or the community. See United 
States v. Salgado, No. 1:09-CR-454-CAP-ECS-5, 2010 WL 3062440, at *4 (N.D. Ga. June 12, 
2010) (upholding warrantless search of cell phone because “the data on the phone could have 
been altered, erased, or deleted remotely”), adopted by 2010 WL 3035755 (N.D. Ga. July 30, 
2010). 
 65. Consent searches can be conducted without probable cause or a warrant so long as 
police obtain permission to search the area freely and voluntarily. See James, 2008 WL 1925032, 
at *4 (upholding search of cell phone’s call log based on consent and the automobile 
exception); United States v. Galante, No. 94 Cr. 633 (LMM), 1995 WL 507249, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 25, 1995) (concluding that consent to search a vehicle also provided consent to search 
cellular phone inside the vehicle); Lemons v. State, 298 S.W.3d 658, 662 (Tex. App. 2009) 
(finding consent to search cell phone for pictures when police asked for permission to search 
phone and defendant responded by handing the phone to the officers). 
 66. United States v. Pineda-Areola, 372 F. App’x 661, 663 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that 
dialing the phone number associated with an arrestee is not a search, but that even if it were, it 
would be permissible to search the phone of an arrestee incident to arrest); United States v. 
Fuentes, 368 F. App’x 95, 99 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (approving search incident to 
arrest of cell phone, though not conducting thorough analysis of the issue); Silvan W. v. Briggs, 
309 F. App’x 216, 225 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he permissible scope of a search incident to arrest 
includes the contents of a cell phone found on the arrestee’s person.”); United States v. 
Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 410–12 (4th Cir. 2009) (upholding search incident to arrest of cell 
phone and rejecting argument that phones with larger storage capacity should be treated 
differently than early-generation cell phones); United States v. Young, 278 F. App’x 242, 246 
(4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (denying motion to suppress text messages found incident to 
arrest); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Faller, 
681 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1046 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (upholding search of cell phone because, even 
though search was not authorized by warrant being executed, police inevitably would have 
arrested defendant and would have been entitled to search the phone incident to arrest); 
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The most prominent case upholding the search of a cell phone incident 
to arrest is the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Finley.67 After 
arresting Finley as part of a staged drug sale, police searched the cell phone 
 
Newhard v. Borders, 649 F. Supp. 2d 440, 448–49 (W.D. Va. 2009) (noting that the Fourth 
Circuit approves searching cell phones incident to arrest and granting officers qualified 
immunity for doing so); Brady v. Gonzalez, No. 08 C 5916, 2009 WL 1952774, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 
July 2, 2009) (concluding, though without performing a thorough analysis, that police may 
examine the contents of a cell phone incident to arrest); United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 
2d 104, 110 (D. Mass. 2009) (“I see no principled basis for distinguishing a warrantless search 
of a cell phone from the search of other types of personal containers found on a defendant’s 
person.”); United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2009) 
(suppressing incriminating photos of drug activity found after an arrest for driving with a 
suspended license because the search was unrelated to the reason for arrest, but noting that if a 
“defendant is arrested for drug-related activity, police may be justified in searching the contents 
of a cell phone for evidence related to the crime of arrest”); United States v. McCray, No. 
CR408-231, 2009 WL 29607 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 5, 2009) (upholding search incident to arrest of cell 
phone for child pornography after arrest for statutory rape); United States v. Santillan, 571 F. 
Supp. 2d 1093, 1104 (D. Ariz. 2008) (upholding search of cell phone’s call history); United 
States v. Gates, Criminal No. 08-42-P-H, 2008 WL 5382285, at *13 (D. Me. Dec. 19, 2008) 
(upholding search incident to arrest of cell phone that occurred “within minutes” of arrest); 
United States v. Deans, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1094 (D. Minn. 2008) (“[I]f a cellphone is 
lawfully seized, officers may also search any data electronically stored in the device.”); United 
States v. Valdez, No. 06-CR-336, 2008 WL 360548, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 8, 2008) (upholding 
search of cell phone’s address book and call log incident to arrest, though noting that “we can 
leave for another day the propriety of a broader search equivalent to the search of a personal 
computer”); United States v. Curry, Criminal No. 07-100-P-H, 2008 WL 219966, at *8–10 (D. 
Me. Jan. 23, 2008) (upholding search of cell phone’s call log for calls from drug informant); 
United States v. Dennis, Criminal No. 07-008-DLB, 2007 WL 3400500, at *7–8 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 
13, 2007) (upholding search of cell phone’s call history under search-incident-to-arrest 
doctrine); United States v. Lottie, No. 3:07-cr-51-AS, 2007 WL 4722439 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 12, 
2007) (upholding search of cell phone primarily on exigency grounds but arguably under the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception as well); United States v. Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d 
1271, 1279 (D. Kan. 2007) (upholding search of cell phone for numbers of outgoing and 
incoming calls); United States v. Murphy, No. 1:06CR00062, 2006 WL 3761384 (W.D. Va. Dec. 
20, 2006) (upholding search of cell phone’s text messages), aff’d, 552 F.3d 405; United States 
v. Diaz, No. CR 05-0167 WHA, 2006 WL 3193770, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2006) (upholding 
recording of names and numbers in address book and recording messages); United States v. 
Zamora, No. 1:05 CR 250 WSD, 2006 WL 418390, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2006) (upholding 
search of cell phone for numbers of outgoing and incoming calls); United States v. Brookes, 
No. CRIM 2004-0154, 2005 WL 1940124, at *3 (D.V.I. June 16, 2005) (upholding search of 
numbers in cell phone and pager); United States v. Cote, No. 03CR271, 2005 WL 1323343, at 
*6 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2005) (upholding search of cell phone’s call log, phone book, and 
wireless web inbox); United States v. Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1303–04 (D. Kan. 2003) 
(upholding search of stored numbers to prevent destruction of evidence); State v. Harris, No. 1 
CA-CR 07-0810, 2008 WL 4368209, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2008) (upholding search of 
photographs on cell phone); People v. Shepard, No. H032876, 2008 WL 4824083 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Nov. 7, 2008) (upholding search of cell phone’s text messages incident to arrest); People 
v. Diaz, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215, 218 (Ct. App. 2008) (upholding search of cell phone ninety 
minutes after arrest and rejecting argument that cell phones should receive more attention 
because they are “capable of storing vast amounts of private information”). 
 67. 477 F.3d 250. 
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in his pocket incident to arrest.68 Officers found incriminating text messages 
related to drug trafficking,69 and Finley was subsequently convicted.70 
On appeal, Finley contended that the search of his cell phone was 
unlawful because the Fourth Amendment permitted only the seizure, and 
not the warrantless search, of his phone.71 Just as in the pager context, the 
Fifth Circuit refused to draw a distinction between wireless technology and 
searches of more traditional containers.72 Citing familiar Supreme Court 
cases—United States v. Robinson and New York v. Belton73—the court explained 
that “[p]olice officers are not constrained to search only for weapons or 
instruments of escape on the arrestee’s person; they may also, without any 
additional justification, look for evidence of the arrestee’s crime on his 
person in order to preserve it for use at trial.”74 In short, the Fifth Circuit 
did not recognize any conceptual difference between searching physical 
containers for drugs and searching electronic equipment for digital 
information. 
The Finley decision remains the most prominent case upholding the 
search of cell phones incident to arrest, but it is far from the only one. 
Approximately thirty other courts have agreed with the reasoning in Finley 
and upheld searches of cell phones incident to arrest.75 
2. A Smaller Number of Cases Have Relied on Varied Rationales 
in Rejecting the Search of Cell Phones Incident to Arrest 
Although the Finley decision is repeatedly cited as the leading case on 
the search incident to arrest of early-generation cell phones, a small number 
of courts have refused to follow its reasoning.76 These courts have employed 
a variety of rationales in rejecting warrantless searches of cell phones. 
 
 68. Id. at 253–54. 
 69. Id. at 254–55. One incoming text message said, “So u wanna get some frozen agua,” a 
common term for methamphetamine. Another text message said, “Call Mark I need a 50,” a 
likely reference to asking for fifty dollars worth of narcotics. Id. at 254 n.2 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 70. Id. at 255. 
 71. Id. at 260. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See supra notes 24–37 and accompanying text. 
 74. Finley, 477 F.3d at 259–60. 
 75. See supra note 66. 
 76. United States v. McGhee, No. 8:09CR31, 2009 WL 2424104, at *3 (D. Neb. July 21, 
2009) (relying on Gant and concluding that search of cell phone incident to arrest was 
unjustified because no evidence related to the crime of arrest (which occurred in early 2008) 
could be found in the phone when the arrest occurred in 2009); United States v. Quintana, 594 
F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (rejecting search incident to arrest of cell phone’s 
photos because defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license and no information 
of that crime could be found on a cell phone); United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR, 2008 
WL 5381412, at *3–4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2008) (finding that search was not contemporaneous 
and was not justified by exigent circumstances or inventory exception), aff’d, 343 F. App’x 564 
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The Ohio Supreme Court, in a recent and closely divided four-to-three 
opinion, is the most prominent court to reject searches of cell phones 
incident to arrest.77 In State v. Smith, the police executed a controlled drug 
buy in which text messages and call records from the arrestee’s phone 
confirmed his involvement in the drug sale.78 Unlike the Fifth Circuit panel 
in Finley, the Ohio Supreme Court refused to accept the crucial premise that 
cell phones are just like any other container that might hold other objects. 
The four-justice majority maintained that to be considered a container 
within the meaning of the Supreme Court’s decision in Belton, the item must 
be capable of holding a “physical object within it.”79 Because cell phones 
hold only intangible data, they could not be containers. Moreover, the 
majority ruled that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine should not apply to 
cell phones because even basic cell phones “are capable of storing a wealth 
of digitized information wholly unlike any physical object found within a 
closed container.”80 The court thus authorized police to seize a cell phone 
incident to arrest but demanded that police obtain a warrant before 
“intruding into the phone’s contents.”81 
 
(11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at 
*8 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007) (rejecting search incident to arrest conducted at station because 
cell phones are possessions within arrestees’ immediate control and cannot be searched at the 
station); United States v. Lasalle, Cr. No. 07-00032 SOM, 2007 WL 1390820 (D. Haw. May 9, 
2007) (finding that search was not contemporaneous); Commonwealth v. Diaz, No. ESCR 
2009-00060, 2009 WL 2963693, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2009) (rejecting search of cell 
phone incident to arrest because it occurred more than twenty minutes after arrest and was 
therefore not contemporaneous); State v. Novicky, No. A07-0170, 2008 WL 1747805, at *4–5 
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2008) (rejecting argument that search of cell phone held in evidence 
since initial arrest could fall under search-incident-to-arrest exception when search was 
conducted on the day of trial); State v. Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d 163, 2009-Ohio-6426, 920 
N.E.2d 949 (holding that cell phones are not containers that can be searched incident to 
arrest). Two other courts have intimated that searches of cell phones incident to arrest should 
be impermissible, without deciding the issue. See United States v. James, No. 1:06CR134 CDP, 
2008 WL 1925032, at *10 n.4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2008) (noting in dicta, and without analysis, 
that even though search of cell phone was proper under a warrant, the district court judge 
disagreed with the magistrate’s conclusion that the search was also justified under the search-
incident-to-arrest doctrine); United States v. Carroll, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1299 (N.D. Ga. 
2008) (expressing skepticism of search incident to arrest of a BlackBerry when a suspect 
surrendered at the police station, but ordering further briefing before deciding the issue). 
Finally, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently rejected the warrantless search of a cell phone’s 
picture gallery, but solely analyzed the issue under the exigent-circumstances and plain-view 
doctrines, without contemplating whether the evidence would be admissible under the search-
incident-to-arrest doctrine. See State v. Carroll, 2010 WI 8, ¶¶ 21–42, 322 Wis. 2d 299, 778 
N.W.2d 1. 
 77. See Smith ¶ 29. 
 78. See id. ¶ 4. 
 79. Id. ¶ 20. 
 80. Id. By contrast, the dissenting justices found the breadth of information held by cell 
phones irrelevant and saw no distinction between the search of a physical address book and the 
search of a cell phone’s contacts page. See id. ¶ 34 (Cupp, J., dissenting). 
 81. Id. ¶ 23 (majority opinion). 
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A federal district judge in California offered a different rationale for 
rejecting the search incident to arrest of cell phones. In United States v. Park, 
police arrested the defendant on drug charges and brought him to the 
police station.82 Approximately ninety minutes following the arrest, the 
police searched his cell phone at the station house and located 
incriminating information.83 Like the Ohio Supreme Court, the Park court 
focused on the “immense amounts of private information” that can be 
stored on cell phones, explaining that “address books, calendars, voice and 
text messages, email, video, and pictures” could reveal “highly personal 
information.”84 However, the Park court did not reject the idea that cell 
phones were containers. Rather, the court asserted that cell phones “should 
not be characterized as an element of [an] individual’s clothing or person, 
but rather as a ‘possession[ ] within an arrestee’s immediate control [that 
has] fourth amendment protection at the station house.’”85 
The Park court pointed to a famous Supreme Court case—United States 
v. Chadwick—in which the Court rejected the search incident to arrest of a 
large footlocker that had been transported to the police station. The 
Chadwick decision seemed to draw a distinction between searches of the 
person—such as clothing and pockets—and searches of possessions within 
an arrestee’s immediate control—such as a footlocker.86 According to the 
Park court’s interpretation of the Chadwick decision, items associated with 
the person of the arrestee can be searched at the scene or later at the police 
station, but items within the arrestee’s immediate control can only be 
searched incident to arrest at the scene, and not later at the police station.87 
Because the search incident to arrest of Park’s cell phone occurred at the 
station, it was therefore impermissible.88 
At least two other federal courts have offered a third rationale for 
suppressing searches of cell phones by looking to the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Arizona v. Gant.89 In Gant, the Supreme Court restricted 
 
 82. No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007). 
 83. Id. at *3–4. 
 84. Id. at *8. 
 85. Id. at *9 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Manclavo-
Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1290 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
 86. Id. at *8 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1977)). 
 87. Id. at *6–7. 
 88. See id. at *9. As I describe in more detail in Part III.C.2, the Park reasoning is 
unpersuasive. Nevertheless, the decision does have its defenders. See Orso, supra note 52, at 
204–06 (advocating a coding–content distinction, but finding the Park decision consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent); Bryan Andrew Stillwagon, Note, Bringing an End to Warrantless Cell 
Phone Searches, 42 GA. L. REV. 1165, 1200 (2008). 
 89. United States v. McGhee, No. 8:09CR31, 2009 WL 2424104, at *3 (D. Neb. July 21, 
2009) (relying on Gant and concluding that search of cell phone incident to arrest was 
unjustified because no evidence related to the crime of arrest (which occurred in early 2008) 
could be found in the phone when the arrest occurred in 2009); United States v. Quintana, 594 
F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1300–01 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (rejecting search of cell phone’s photos incident 
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searches of automobiles incident to arrest to situations in which “the 
arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment at the time of the search”90 or “when it is ‘reasonable to 
believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the 
vehicle.’”91 The Court’s decision in Gant was clearly limited to searches of 
automobiles incident to arrest, but these district courts evidently believed 
that the Court’s logic extended (or should be extended in the future) to cell 
phones as well. 
Finally, a number of courts have suppressed evidence found in searches 
of cell phones incident to arrest on the grounds that the search was not 
contemporaneous with the arrest. For example, in Commonwealth v. Diaz, the 
arrestee’s cell phone repeatedly rang while he was being booked at the 
police station.92 After four or five calls, an officer answered the phone and 
heard the caller attempt to buy drugs.93 Relying in part on the fact that the 
officer answered the phone twenty minutes after arrest, a Massachusetts 
court suppressed evidence of the phone call because it occurred too long 
after arrest to be contemporaneous.94 In United States v. Lasalle, a federal 
district judge grappled with a much lengthier time gap when police 
searched a cell phone at least two hours (and possibly up to four hours) 
after officers arrested the suspect.95 Importantly, these 
contemporaneousness cases limit, but do not outrightly forbid, the search of 
cell phones incident to arrest.96 
C. THE BIG PICTURE: WHERE THE LAW CURRENTLY STANDS AND 
WHAT IS LIKELY TO OCCUR IN THE NEAR FUTURE 
As Part II.B demonstrates, a growing body of caselaw grapples with the 
searches of cell phones incident to arrest. Although it is relatively early in 
 
to arrest because defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license and no 
information of that crime could be found on a cell phone); see also United States v. McCray, No. 
CR408-231, 2009 WL 29607, at *4 n.4 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 5, 2009) (upholding limited search of cell 
phone following arrest for statutory rape but noting that “[t]his case . . . does not present the 
question of whether a cell phone (a kind of computer capable of storing vast amounts of data) 
may be subjected to a comprehensive search incident to a defendant’s arrest for a simple traffic 
violation”). 
 90. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009). 
 91. Id. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment)). 
 92. No. ESCR 2009-00060, 2009 WL 2963693, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2009). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at *6. 
 95. Cr. No. 07-00032 SOM, 2007 WL 1390820, at *7 (D. Haw. May 9, 2007). 
 96. In addition to Diaz and Lasalle, a federal court in Florida also found a warrantless 
search of a cell phone incident to arrest unconstitutional because it was conducted at the 
station and not contemporaneously with arrest. United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR, 2008 
WL 5381412, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2008), aff’d, 343 F. App’x 564 (11th Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam). The Wall court did not specify how long after arrest the search was conducted. 
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the development of this area of law, Part II.C.1, below, draws several big-
picture conclusions on the state of the law. Part II.C.2 then explores whether 
a Supreme Court decision or legislative activity will have any effect on law 
enforcement’s ability to search cell phones incident to arrest in the near 
future. 
1. The Current State of the Law and Practice of Searching 
Cell Phones Incident to Arrest 
Although the issues surrounding the search incident to arrest of cell 
phones are still evolving, several things are clear. First, the number of cases 
addressing the issue is on the rise, suggesting that the number of searches by 
police on patrol may also be on the rise. While courts decided only six cases 
involving searches of cell phones incident to arrest between 2003 and 
2006,97 an additional thirty-one decisions were handed down from 2007 
through the middle of 2010.98 Over the last few years, more than a dozen 
additional courts have addressed searches of cell phones under the 
automobile exception, the inventory doctrine, exigency, and consent 
rationales.99 
Second, most courts to address the constitutionality of searching cell 
phones incident to arrest have upheld the practice. At present, roughly 
thirty courts have approved cell-phone searches incident to arrest under the 
logic that police can search any container on an arrestee, including digital 
containers.100 
Third, although a handful of cases suppressed evidence found through 
searches of cell phones incident to arrest, most of those courts did not 
outrightly reject the practice in all circumstances. Most courts that have 
suppressed evidence found through searches of cell phones incident to 
arrest have done so on the grounds that the search occurred too long after 
the arrest to be contemporaneous.101 Indeed, in the most cited case 
rejecting the search of cell phones incident to arrest—United States v. Park—
the court did not rule that cell phones could never be searched incident to 
arrest.102 Rather, the Park court simply rejected the search under the 
particular facts of that case. To date, of the approximately forty cases to 
 
 97. See supra note 66. 
 98. See supra note 66. 
 99. See supra notes 62–65. 
 100. See supra Part II.B. 
 101. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text. 
 102. No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007); see also United 
States v. Curry, Criminal No. 07-100-P-H, 2008 WL 219966, at *9 (D. Me. Jan. 23, 2008) 
(discussing the Park decision and noting that “[t]he Park court deemed cell phones analogous 
instead to possessions within an arrestee’s control (such as closed containers or luggage) that 
lawfully may be searched without a warrant only if the search is ‘substantially contemporaneous’ 
with the arrest”). 
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address the search incident to arrest of a cell phone,103 only a single case—
the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Smith—has expressly forbid 
the search of cell phones incident to arrest.104 
Fourth, when courts have addressed whether the search of a cell phone 
was contemporaneous with arrest, their decisions have been far from 
uniform. For example, police searched two unrelated defendants (who 
ironically were both named Diaz) incident to their respective arrests in 
Massachusetts and California. In the Massachusetts case, the court found a 
search twenty minutes after arrest too late to be contemporaneous.105 By 
contrast, the California court found a search that occurred ninety minutes 
after arrest perfectly acceptable.106 
Finally, although the vast majority of cases have involved early-
generation cell phones, rather than smart phones, the trend of the law 
strongly indicates that courts will reach the same results when cases involving 
iPhones, BlackBerries, and other advanced cell phones reach the courts, 
since in approving the search incident to arrest of cell phones, courts have 
rejected the argument that cell phones should be treated differently simply 
because they can hold large amounts of private data.107 
2. New Directions in the Law and Private Responses to the Problem 
Having sketched the current state of police authority to search cell 
phones incident to arrest, the harder task is to predict whether there will be 
any major changes in the law moving forward. Change could occur through 
any of three avenues: (1) the Supreme Court could narrow the search-
incident-to-arrest doctrine; (2) state legislatures could impose statutory 
restrictions on police authority to search the cell phones of arrestees; or (3) 
cell-phone users could password protect their phones and shift the legal 
issues into more complicated Fourth and Fifth Amendment territory. I 
consider each of these possibilities in turn. 
a. The Supreme Court Could (But Likely Will Not) Curb 
Broad Police Power To Search Cell Phones 
It is possible that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari in the next few 
years to rule on the constitutionality of searching cell phones incident to 
 
 103. See supra note 66. 
 104. See State v. Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d 163, 2009-Ohio-6426, 920 N.E.2d 949. 
 105. Commonwealth v. Diaz, No. ESCR 2009-0060, 2009 WL 2963693 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Sept. 3, 2009). 
 106. See People v. Diaz, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 107. United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the argument that 
smart phones should be treated differently than ordinary phones because there is no standard 
for separating large-capacity from small-capacity phones, and information contained within 
larger-capacity phones could still be volatile and disappear while police get a warrant). 
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arrest.108 While the vast majority of lower court cases have approved the 
search incident to arrest of cell phones, there is still a split of authority.109 
If the Court was inclined to limit or prevent the search of cell phones 
incident to arrest, it could do so in two ways. First, the Court could agree 
with the Ohio Supreme Court that cell phones are not containers and 
require police to obtain warrants to search their contents. Given that cell 
phones regularly contain evidence of criminal activity that can be quickly 
destroyed (even from remote locations), it is unlikely the Court would take 
this approach. Second, and more plausibly, the Court could expand its 
recent decision in Arizona v. Gant beyond the automobile context and limit 
searches incident to arrest to those scenarios where police are likely to find 
evidence related to the reason for the arrest. Presently, police can still search 
a cigarette package in an arrestee’s shirt pocket when the driver is arrested 
for driving with a suspended license, but police cannot search the arrestee’s 
glove compartment or cigarette package if the arrestee has already been 
restrained. 
In its search-incident-to-arrest jurisprudence, the Court has long 
endorsed bright-line rules that will be workable for police on the street. If 
after a few years of experience, the Gant rule proves workable, it will not be 
surprising to see the Court apply the same rationale to searches of arrestees. 
The Gant rule would seemingly reduce the number of cell-phone searches 
conducted incident to arrest because for most crimes (such as traffic 
offenses, murder, rape, and robbery), any potential evidence contained in 
an arrestee’s cell phone will not be related to the reason for arrest. 
On the other hand, there is reason to be less optimistic about the Gant 
solution. First, the Court may simply refuse to extend Gant to nonvehicle 
searches incident to arrest. The Court could conclude that when arresting 
individuals, there is always a need to search the arrestee to prevent the 
destruction of evidence or the risk of violence. To maintain a bright-line 
rule, the Court may be unwilling to delineate the circumstances in which 
some cell-phone searches are permissible and others are not. 
Second, even if the Court does extend the Gant doctrine to cell phones, 
there is no telling when that will happen. Justice Scalia made a strong case 
for limiting the search incident to arrest of vehicles in his 2004 concurrence 
in Thornton v. United States; yet the Court did not adopt his position until five 
years later in Gant. 
 
 108. Following the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision rejecting the search incident to arrest of 
cell phones, the Supreme Court of the United States requested a response to the Government’s 
petition for certiorari. See Docket, SUPREME COURT U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search. 
aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/09-1377.htm. Although the Supreme Court ultimately denied the 
petition for certiorari, State v. Smith, 131 S. Ct. 102 (2010), the request for briefing may 
indicate that at least one member of the Court has some interest in the question. 
 109. See supra notes 66–96 and accompanying text. 
A1 - GERSHOWITZ.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2011  11:51 AM 
1146 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:1125 
Third, even if the Gant rule seemingly forbids many cell-phone 
searches, police can find ways to circumvent the rule. Police might (albeit on 
thinner grounds) arrest a traffic violator for a drug offense, rather than only 
for driving with a suspended license. The officer might testify that the car 
smelled of marijuana or that the defendant appeared glassy eyed and under 
the influence of illegal drugs.110 Because cell phones are recognized tools of 
the drug trade and drug dealers regularly use text messages to 
communicate, police could plausibly claim a phone contains evidence 
related to the drug arrest. Of course, I do not mean to suggest that police 
will always be able to find ways around the Gant rule. But it is wise to 
remember that police officers (and the lawyers who train them about search 
and seizure) have long found ways to circumvent Supreme Court rules 
limiting their authority to search and investigate.111 
In sum, while it is possible that the Gant doctrine will drastically reduce 
the number of cell-phone searches conducted incident to arrest, the Court 
must first adopt that doctrine and do so in a way that prevents clever law-
enforcement officers from evading the rule. The prospects of that occurring 
in the near future are uncertain, to say the least. 
b. Legislative Efforts To Curb Warrantless Cell-Phone Searches Are Nonexistent 
Regardless of whether the Supreme Court restricts the search-incident-
to-arrest doctrine, state legislatures could restrict searches of cell phones by 
amending their codes of criminal procedure. For instance, over three 
decades ago, the Massachusetts legislature codified a much more restrictive 
version of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine because it believed the 
Supreme Court granted far too expansive authority to law enforcement to 
search arrestees.112 
However, the prospect of legislatures taking steps to specifically narrow 
police authority to search cell phones is extremely unlikely. Despite the 
dozens of cases involving warrantless searches of cell phones over the last 
 
 110. The officer might also slow down the traffic stop and wait for a drug-sniffing dog that 
could provide a positive alert for drugs, thus allowing an arrest on drug charges. 
 111. See Donald Dripps, The Fourth Amendment, The Exclusionary Rule, and the Roberts Court: 
Normative and Empirical Dimensions of the Over-Deterrence Hypothesis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 209, 238 
(2010) (“[T]here is substantial evidence tending to show that police professionalism actually 
increases the risk that the police will exploit weaknesses in the remedial scheme by violating 
substantive Fourth Amendment rights for the sake of incriminating evidence. The exclusionary 
rule gives cities and departments an incentive to train their forces, but the training the police 
receive seems to be more concerned with admissibility than with legality.”). 
 112. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 1 (2008) (“A search conducted incident to an arrest 
may be made only for the purposes of seizing fruits, instrumentalities, contraband and other 
evidence of the crime for which the arrest has been made, in order to prevent its destruction or 
concealment; and removing any weapons that the arrestee might use to resist arrest or effect his 
escape. Property seized as a result of a search in violation of the provisions of this paragraph 
shall not be admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings.”). 
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decade, the author is unaware of a single proposed bill to restrict such 
searches, or even a solitary legislative hearing to investigate the increasingly 
common practice.113 
It is, of course, possible that a legislator will become interested in the 
practice and hold hearings on warrantless cell-phone searches. It is even 
possible that a legislator could drum up enough support to pass a law 
restricting searches of cell phones incident to arrest. But such a turn of 
events is unlikely to occur in a single state, and almost certainly will not 
occur in a sufficient number of states to effect any serious change in the 
current nationwide practice. If past is prologue, the prospect of legislative 
action is almost nil. 
c. Individual Efforts: Password Protecting Cell Phones 
With Supreme Court intervention uncertain, and legislative protection 
unlikely, protection against searches incident to arrest is left to cell-phone 
users themselves. Because the very purpose of cell phones is their 
convenience, users obviously will not leave them at home or store them in 
the trunk of their cars where they will be safe from the search-incident-to-
arrest doctrine.114 The only plausible option is for users to password protect 
their phones. Although early-generation cell phones did not come equipped 
with user-friendly password systems, popular smart phones on the market 
today—including iPhones, BlackBerries, and Droids—contain password 
features that enable users to restrict access to the phones’ contents. 
Without question, password protecting a phone makes it considerably 
harder for the police to search it incident to arrest. But it does not make it 
impossible. Parts III and IV below consider whether police can attempt to 
crack passwords and, if they are unable to do so, whether they can request or 
demand that an arrestee provide his password as part of the search-incident-
to-arrest process. 
III. CAN POLICE ATTEMPT TO BREAK INTO A PASSWORD-PROTECTED PHONE? 
Assuming that cell-phone users opt to password protect their phones, 
the first important question is whether police can attempt to decipher and 
enter the password to access data on the phone. The answer to this question 
seems to be “yes.” Importantly, simply password protecting a phone does not 
 
 113. A Westlaw search of “bill or law or legislation or rule or propos! w/10 limit or restrict 
or curtail or reduce w/10 search w/10 ‘cell phone’” in the ALL NEWS database turns up only 
two articles, both of which involved the tangential issue of a single school district’s new policy 
restricting cell phone searches by teachers. Deb Kollars, Student Wins Fight over Cell Phone Privacy, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 18, 2008, 2008 WLNR 7299431; Scott Smith, Cell Text Snooping Draws 
Ire: Linden School Changes Policy After Incident, RECORD (Stockton), Apr. 18, 2008, 2008 WLNR 
7288213. 
 114. Ordinarily, police cannot search the trunk of a vehicle incident to arrest. See New York 
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 n.4 (1981). 
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cloak it in impenetrable Fourth Amendment protection. As Part III.A 
demonstrates, the fact that a suspect has locked an item and made it difficult 
for the police to acquire the evidence does not immunize it from police 
authority to search. As detailed in Part III.B, lower courts have granted law 
enforcement considerable leeway to break into containers when searching 
incident to arrest. Whether the search involves a locked glove box, a locked 
briefcase, or a sealed container, police generally are permitted to pick the 
lock or even break it to conduct a search incident to arrest. Under this rule, 
therefore, police should be free to tinker with passwords to search the 
contents of a cell phone incident to arrest. However, this authority is not 
without limits: A crucial part of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine 
requires the search to be contemporaneous with the arrest. As Part III.C 
explains, court decisions are very inconsistent when it comes to how long 
after arrest police may continue to conduct a search incident to arrest. 
Nevertheless, Part III.C outlines the parameters of how long police likely 
have to attempt to crack a cell-phone password. 
A. PASSWORD PROTECTING A PHONE DOES NOT CLOAK IT IN 
IMPENETRABLE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
AND PREVENT ALL WARRANTLESS SEARCHES 
If a cell-phone user has protected her phone with a strong password 
that combines letters, numbers, and symbols, the chances of police 
randomly guessing the password should be slim. With such low odds of 
success, our first instinct might be that the Fourth Amendment offers 
rigorous protection and prevents any police attempt to bypass a password 
without first procuring a search warrant. That assumption is incorrect. 
Fourth Amendment protection is not awarded on a statistical basis simply 
because the odds of police actually finding the evidence are low.115 
Consider the following case highlighted by Professor Orin Kerr in an 
article about cyberspace encryption.116 In United States v. Scott, the defendant 
shredded incriminating documents and threw them out with his trash.117 
Government agents went through Scott’s trash, “painstakingly” pieced the 
documents back together over multiple days, and used the evidence against 
 
 115. Professor Orin Kerr offers the example of a burglar stealing from an unoccupied 
home. The burglar may correctly believe that the odds of law enforcement finding him in the 
house are very low. Yet, despite the statistical probability, courts still do not conclude that the 
burglar has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the house. Rather, because Fourth 
Amendment analysis is conducted from a rights-based perspective, rather than a statistical 
perspective, courts conclude that the burglar has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
victim’s house. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create a 
“Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?,” 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 518 (2001). 
 116. Id. at 513–18. The discussion of the cases that follows is drawn primarily from 
Professor Kerr’s excellent article. 
 117. 975 F.2d 927, 928 (1st Cir. 1992). 
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him.118 Although individuals ordinarily do not have an expectation of 
privacy in trash they discard at the curb (and thus are not entitled to any 
Fourth Amendment protection whatsoever), Scott contended that by 
shredding the documents so thoroughly, he made it very difficult for the 
police to see any evidence and, thus, created a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his shredded documents.119 The First Circuit rejected this 
argument, explaining that while Scott went to great lengths to make it more 
difficult for the police to view the evidence, this did not create a privacy 
expectation in the trash where none existed before.120 The court 
emphasized that a defendant’s constitutional protection does not turn on 
the odds of recovering the evidence.121 
In the cell-phone context, unlike the trash in Scott, individuals obviously 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of their phones.122 
But courts have repeatedly held that the privacy interest in a phone can be 
overcome under the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine. Password protecting 
the phone, and thus making it harder for law enforcement to access the 
evidence, does not eliminate police authority to conduct the search incident 
to arrest.123 Put simply, the fact that it is difficult for police to unearth 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. at 928–30. 
 120. See id. at 930 (“Should the mere use of more sophisticated ‘higher’ technology in 
attempting destruction of the pieces of paper grant higher constitutional protection to this 
failed attempt at secrecy? We think not. . . . A person who prepares incriminatory documents in 
a secret code [or for that matter in some obscure foreign language], and thereafter blithely 
discards them as trash, relying on the premise or hope that they will not be deciphered [or 
translated] by the authorities could well be in for an unpleasant surprise if his code is ‘broken’ 
by the police [or a translator is found for the abstruse language], but he cannot make a valid 
claim that his subjective expectation in keeping the contents private by use of the secret code 
[or language] was reasonable in a constitutional sense.”). 
 121. Id. Courts have similarly held that drug couriers cannot claim a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the drugs they are smuggling simply because they have hidden the 
drugs well and made it hard for law enforcement to find them. See United States v. Sarda-Villa, 
760 F.2d 1232, 1236–37 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Drug smugglers can not assert standing solely on 
the basis that they hid the drugs well and hoped no one would find them.”). Likewise, courts 
have held that encoding communications in a foreign language or burying files deep in a 
computer does not add any privacy expectation. See United States v. Longoria, 177 F.3d 1179, 
1183 (10th Cir. 1999) (speaking in foreign language); Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 587 
A.2d 1353, 1355–56 (Pa. 1991) (attempting to delete computer files), abrogated on other grounds 
by Commonwealth v. Rizzuto, 777 A.2d 1069 (Pa. 2001), abrogated by Commonwealth v. 
Freeman, 827 A.2d 385 (Pa. 2003). 
 122. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 258–59 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding that 
Finely had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell phone even though his employer 
provided it to him). 
 123. See Kerr, supra note 115, at 522 (“[T]he lock is not critical to establish Fourth 
Amendment protection [in a briefcase]: if I have a right to keep people from looking in my 
briefcase . . . I will have a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ even without the lock.”). 
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evidence from a password-protected cell phone does not give the phone 
unlimited Fourth Amendment protection against searches.124 
Of course, I do not want to suggest that password protecting the phone 
is completely irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis. When searching a 
cell phone that is not password protected, police essentially search a closed 
container, like a glove compartment in a vehicle.125 When the cell phone is 
password protected, however, the container is not only closed, but is locked, 
like a glove compartment that cannot be opened without a key. The 
important question is therefore not whether the password somehow 
immunizes the phone from police investigation (it doesn’t), but whether the 
police are permitted to open a locked container under the search-incident-
to-arrest doctrine. As explained in Part III.B below, caselaw strongly suggests 
that police are free to attempt to unlock a password-protected cell phone. 
B. POLICE CAN SEARCH LOCKED CONTAINERS INCIDENT TO ARREST 
Although the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine has existed for over 
seventy years, the Supreme Court has never clearly stated whether police are 
permitted to open locked containers when searching incident to arrest. 
Nevertheless, the Court’s decision in New York v. Belton (authorizing the 
search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle) broadly stated that police 
can search “any” container, whether “open or closed.”126 And the Belton 
dissenters clearly expressed their belief that the decision extended to locked 
containers.127 As explained below, in the years since Belton, lower courts 
have reached fairly uniform consensus permitting police to search locked 
containers as long as they do not irreparably damage them. 
 
 124. See id. at 517 (“When the government obtains ciphertext that can only be decrypted 
with an individual’s private key, that individual enjoys an excellent chance that the government 
will be unable to discover the key and decrypt the communication. However, the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect the individual if the government decides to devote its resources 
to decrypting the communication and manages to succeed.”). 
 125. For a discussion of cell phones being treated as closed containers, see supra notes 72–
74 and accompanying text. 
 126. 453 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1981) (“It follows from this conclusion that the police may also 
examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment, for if the 
passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be within his 
reach. Such a container may, of course, be searched whether it is open or closed, since the 
justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container . . . .” 
(footnote omitted) (citations omitted)). 
 127. Id. at 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Under the approach taken today, the result 
would presumably be the same . . . if [the] search had extended to locked luggage or other 
inaccessible containers located in the back seat of the car.”); id. at 472 (White, J., dissenting) 
(“The Court now holds that as incident to the arrest of the driver or any other person in an 
automobile, the interior of the car and any container found therein, whether locked or not, 
may be not only seized but also searched even absent probable cause to believe that contraband 
or evidence of crime will be found.”). 
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1. Searching Locked Physical Containers 
The most common example of police searching a locked container is 
the search of vehicles’ glove compartments. For nearly three decades, courts 
have almost unanimously128 held that police may open locked glove 
compartments during searches incident to arrest.129 
Some courts have gone beyond glove compartments to permit searches 
incident to arrest of even more secure containers, such as locked safes and 
footlockers. In United States v. Thomas, the Sixth Circuit approved the search 
incident to arrest of a locked twenty-pound safe found inside a tote bag on 
the backseat of the arrestee’s pickup truck.130 Officers removed the car keys 
from the truck’s ignition and found the key to the safe on the key ring. The 
 
 128. To be sure, there is contrary authority. Nearly twenty-five years ago, the Washington 
Supreme Court looked to its state constitution to offer a more protective holding forbidding 
searches of locked containers incident to arrest. State v. Stroud, 720 P.2d 436, 441 (Wash. 
1986) (en banc) (holding that “if the officers encounter a locked container or locked glove 
compartment, they may not unlock and search either container without obtaining a warrant”), 
overruled in part by State v. Valdez, 224 P.3d 751 (Wash. 2009) (en banc); see also id. at 439 
(“Our divergence from the decisions of federal courts is based on this heightened protection of 
privacy required by our state constitution.”). The court offered two rationales for this 
divergence. First, “by locking the container, the individual has shown that he or she reasonably 
expects the contents to remain private.” Id. at 441. Second, the court believed that an arrestee 
would be unable to retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence from a locked container, thus 
eliminating the primary justifications for searching incident to arrest. See id. The first 
explanation makes little sense. The search-incident-to-arrest doctrine allows searches of areas 
the individual expects to keep private. Police are permitted to search jacket pockets, purses, and 
under vehicle seats to look for weapons even though individuals have an expectation of privacy 
in all of those locations. The second argument is more compelling because, realistically 
speaking, arrestees are very unlikely to be able to escape custody, unlock a glove box, and 
retrieve a weapon before being stopped by police. Nevertheless, as the Washington Supreme 
Court acknowledged, this approach ignores the bright-line approach the U.S. Supreme Court 
has long embraced for searches incident to arrest. 
 129. United States v. Nichols, 512 F.3d 789, 797–98 (6th Cir. 2008) (“We therefore join 
the unanimous view of our sister circuits in holding that the search-incident-to-arrest authority 
permits an officer to search a glove box, whether open or closed, locked or unlocked.”); United 
States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 827 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Woody, 55 F.3d 1257, 
1270 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 1985); State v. 
Hanna, 839 P.2d 450, 452 (Ariz. 1992); People v. Perez, 214 P.3d 502, 506 (Colo. App. 2009), 
rev’d en banc, 231 P.3d 957 (Colo. 2010); State v. Farr, 587 A.2d 1047, 1050 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1991); State v. Church, No. 08006784, 2008 WL 4947653 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2008); 
Lewis v. United States, 632 A.2d 383 (D.C. 1993); Staten v. United States, 562 A.2d 90 (D.C. 
1989); Smith v. United States, 435 A.2d 1066 (D.C. 1981) (per curiam); State v. Gonzalez, 507 
So. 2d 772 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); People v. Dieppa, 830 N.E.2d 870 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); 
Hamel v. State, 943 A.2d 686 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008); State v. Brooks, 446 S.E.2d 579, 588 
(N.C. 1994); State v. Massenburg, 310 S.E.2d 619, 622 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Reed, 634 
S.W.2d 665 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982); State v. Fry, 388 N.W.2d 565 (Wis. 1986), overruled by 
State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97, petition for cert. filed, No. 10-
7057 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2010). In many cases, officers unlocked the glove box by simply using the 
ignition key. In some cases however, courts have upheld searches where police physically forced 
open the glove box without a key. See, e.g., Smith, 435 A.2d at 1068. 
 130. 11 F.3d 620, 625, 628 (6th Cir. 1993). 
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court concluded that searching the safe fell squarely within the search-
incident-to-arrest doctrine.131 Similarly, an Illinois court upheld the search 
incident to arrest of a locked footlocker on the grounds that it was no 
different than a locked glove compartment.132 
Courts have likewise permitted police to search locked briefcases133 and 
overnight bags134 incident to arrest. One federal court even upheld a search 
incident to arrest when police pried open the latch of a locked briefcase 
with a screwdriver.135 Lower courts have also upheld police searches of 
sealed boxes in which police had to tear through tape to access the contents. 
For instance, a Florida appellate court approved the search incident to 
arrest of “two large, sealed U-Haul boxes” in the backseat of a station 
wagon.136 Without extensive analysis, the Fifth Circuit upheld a similar 
search incident to arrest of “cardboard boxes sealed with masking tape.”137 
Courts have been less consistent in cases where police tamper with the 
structural integrity of the passenger compartment of the vehicle. As a 
general rule, courts have forbidden police from dismantling the interior of 
the vehicle when searching incident to arrest.138 Thus, courts have 
suppressed evidence police found where police removed a vehicle seat139 or 
dismantled a tailgate140 when searching incident to arrest. Yet even in the 
face of this logical rule,141 a number of lower courts have given police leeway 
to conduct searches of sealed areas incident to arrest. For example, the 
Eighth Circuit upheld a search incident to arrest of the space between the 
window’s rubber seal and the door panel.142 A federal court in 
 
 131. See id. at 628. 
 132. People v. Tripp, 715 N.E.2d 689, 698 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
 133. See United States v. Valiant, 873 F.2d 205, 206 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Howe, 
313 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184–86 (D. Utah 2003). 
 134. See Pack v. Commonwealth, 368 S.E.2d 921, 922 (Va. Ct. App. 1988). 
 135. See Howe, 313 F. Supp. 2d. at 1182, 1184–85. 
 136. Shaw v. State, 449 So. 2d 976, 978 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
 137. United States v. Alvarado Garcia, 781 F.2d 422, 424 (5th Cir. 1986), overruled on other 
grounds by United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 138. See 1 DAVID S. RUDSTEIN ET AL., CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.06[4][b], at 2-240 
(2009) (“[L]ower courts [have] generally excluded areas that required dismantling, such as the 
interior of the door panels or the tailgate, the upholstery of the car, the area under the 
floorboards, or the area behind the glove compartment or radio.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 139. State v. Cuellar, 511 A.2d 745, 748 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.) (rejecting search 
incident to arrest where “[t]he police officer then removed the seat entirely from the 
automobile, which exposed the entire panel, and pulled away the panel for the chassis”), aff’d, 
523 A.2d 662 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986). 
 140. See United States v. Patterson, 65 F.3d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 141. See David S. Rudstein, The Search of an Automobile Incident to an Arrest: An Analysis of New 
York v. Belton, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 205, 239–40 (1984) (arguing that police should not be 
permitted to dismantle parts of vehicles during searches incident to arrest). 
 142. United States v. Barnes, 374 F.3d 601, 604 (8th Cir. 2004) (“The search incident to 
arrest in this case involved the area immediately inside the rubber window seal . . . .”). 
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Massachusetts approved the search of a heating vent inside of the passenger 
compartment of a vehicle.143 The Seventh Circuit allowed police to dislodge 
a removable radio and search the space in the dashboard where it had been 
located.144 Several courts have upheld searches of the area beneath a 
gearshift incident to arrest, even where officers had to loosen the plastic 
cover and snap out the console to gain access.145 
Although it is difficult to state a rule that explains the results of all of 
these cases, when assessing the search incident to arrest of locked or sealed 
containers, three key principles emerge. First, courts almost always permit 
police to utilize a key to unlock containers. Second, when no key is available, 
some courts approve of police physically breaking locks to examine the 
container’s contents, although these courts have not offered detailed 
analysis justifying their decisions. Finally, when dealing with sections of the 
passenger compartment of a vehicle that are easily disassembled (such as 
gear shift covers or removable radios), courts seemingly embrace a version 
of the slogan “you break it, you buy it,” and uphold the searches as long as 
officers do not damage the vehicle. It is only when police have broken items 
or dismantled major sections of a vehicle that courts unequivocally reject the 
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine. 
2. Searching a Locked (Password-Protected) Phone Is Permissible 
To date, only two courts have been called on to determine whether 
individuals can be forced to turn over passwords to their computer files, and 
both cases involved grand-jury subpoenas, rather than searches incident to 
arrest.146 Nevertheless, cases involving searches incident to arrest of 
password-protected phones are likely to arise in the near future. The 
number of Americans utilizing iPhones and other smart phones is growing 
exponentially each year, and each new generation of smart phone is capable 
of holding more and more private data.147 Either out of fear of law 
enforcement or the simple possibility of losing the phone, users are likely to 
 
 143. United States v. Patrick, 3 F. Supp. 2d 95, 99 (D. Mass. 1998) (noting that the First 
Circuit permits searches of any area in passenger compartment as long as officers do not 
“dismantl[e] door panels or other parts of the car” (internal quotation mark omitted)), aff’d, 
248 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2001). The Patrick court found that the search occurred too long after the 
arrest to be a contemporaneous search incident to arrest, but it ultimately upheld the search 
under the automobile exception. See id. at 104. 
 144. United States v. Willis, 37 F.3d 313 (7th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Veras, 51 
F.3d 1365, 1368 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding search of secret compartment “[b]uilt into the 
deck between the back seat and the rear window” under the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine). 
 145. State v. Homolka, 953 P.2d 612 (Idaho 1998); People v. Eaton, 617 N.W.2d 363 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2000). 
 146. See United States v. Kirschner, Misc No. 09-MC-50872, 2010 WL 1257355 (E.D. Mich. 
Mar. 30, 2010); In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). 
 147. See Shan Li, iPhone 4 Deliveries Beat Official Launch, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 2010, at B3. 
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begin password protecting their phones at greater rates.148 Indeed, there are 
already a handful of cases where police have encountered password-
protected phones and either procured the password by consent149 or given 
up on searching the phone because of the password.150 As password 
protection becomes more common, police officers who believe a phone 
contains incriminating evidence, and who lack the necessary suspicion or 
time to get a warrant, will try to crack passwords and gain access to cell 
phones. 
It seems clear that police can attempt to crack a cell-phone password 
during a search incident to arrest.151 Just as police are permitted to try all of 
the keys on the defendant’s keychain until they locate the one that unlocks 
the glove compartment, police should be able to try multiple different 
combinations in an effort to discover the password to a phone. 
Of course, there should still be limits on the manner in which police 
can search a cell phone incident to arrest. First, as with tangible objects like 
an automobile, police should be cabined by a rule forbidding them from 
destroying an object to search it incident to arrest. Many cell phones contain 
a function that deletes the contents of the phone if the password is 
incorrectly entered a certain number of consecutive times. If the phone 
alerted the officer that another incorrect password entry would erase the 
contents of the phone, police should not be permitted to make that final 
guess.152 
A second restriction on police efforts to break a password is the 
requirement that the search of the phone be contemporaneous with arrest. 
Breaking the password may be time-consuming, and for a search to be truly 
incident to arrest, there must be time limits on how long police can take to 
conduct the search. Part III.C discusses the major unresolved issues related 
to the temporal limit on searching cell phones incident to arrest. 
C. ATTEMPTS TO BREAK PASSWORDS MUST BE CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH ARREST 
In remarking on the breadth of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, 
Professor Wayne Logan explained in 2001 that, “[i]ncreasingly, the sole 
 
 148. See United States v. Lasalle, Cr. No. 07-00032 SOM, 2007 WL 1390820, at *2 (D. Haw. 
May 9, 2007) (noting that police found two phones during a drug arrest, one of which was 
password-protected). 
 149. See People v. Villasana, No. F056773, 2010 WL 7122, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2010) 
(upholding search of phone that had been password-protected). 
 150. See People v. Hall, No. D053791, 2009 WL 4549188, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 
2009). 
 151. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 152. Just as police are not permitted to tear apart a vehicle’s upholstery in searching 
incident to arrest, they should not be permitted to destroy the contents of a cell phone to 
recover evidence. Of course, if the failed password attempts actually resulted in wiping the 
phone’s contents clean, there would be no evidence for the police to acquire through the 
search incident to arrest of the phone. 
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limit[] on search incident authority [is] that the search be more or less 
‘contemporaneous’ with the arrest.”153 Nearly a decade later, Professor 
Logan’s observation rings true for the search incident to arrest of cell 
phones. Unfortunately, the meaning of contemporaneous varies widely from 
court to court. Some find searches occurring hours after arrest 
contemporaneous, whereas others believe even twenty minutes is far too 
long. Further complicating the contemporaneousness inquiry is that the 
length of time police have to crack a password may depend on whether cell 
phones are categorized as an “item associated with the person of an 
arrestee,” or as property near the arrestee. If cell phones are items associated 
with the person of an arrestee, a 1974 Supreme Court case seemingly gives 
police great flexibility to search them long after arrest, even after they have 
been brought to the police station.154 By contrast, if cell phones are 
possessions near the arrestee, a 1977 Supreme Court decision limits 
searches to a short time after arrest, and primarily to the scene of the arrest 
itself.155 
1. Different Rules for Searching Items Associated with the Person 
and Items That Are Merely Nearby Possessions 
In ascertaining how long police can spend trying to crack a password, it 
is best to begin by determining whether cell phones are items immediately 
associated with the arrestee or are merely possessions near the arrestee. This 
distinction requires us to parse two Supreme Court cases from the 1970s. 
In the somewhat obscure case of Edwards, police arrested Edwards at 11 
p.m. for attempting to break into a government building.156 Edwards was 
promptly brought to jail, processed, and placed in a cell.157 Overnight, 
police discovered that the perpetrator had attempted to enter a wooden 
window and that he would likely have paint chips from the window on his 
clothing.158 The following morning, ten hours after his arrest, police took 
Edwards’s clothing from him to search for paint chips.159 Edwards moved to 
suppress the evidence on the grounds that the search of his clothes occurred 
too long after arrest to fall within the search-incident-to-arrest exception.160 
The Supreme Court rejected Edwards’s argument and gave police wide 
 
 153. Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority To Search Incident to Arrest, 
19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 396 (2001). 
 154. See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 805 (1974). 
 155. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977). 
 156. 415 U.S. at 801. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 801–02. 
 159. Id. at 802. 
 160. See id. 
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authority to conduct the search incident to arrest well after the arrest was 
conducted.161 
Three years later, in the better-known case of Chadwick, officers arrested 
Chadwick as he attempted to load a double-locked footlocker into his 
vehicle.162 One set of agents brought Chadwick to a federal building, and 
another group of agents followed behind with the footlocker.163 
Approximately ninety minutes after the arrest, federal agents opened the 
footlocker and discovered a large quantity of marijuana.164 Unlike in 
Edwards, the Supreme Court rejected the Government’s argument that the 
footlocker could be searched incident to arrest. In a brief footnote, the 
Court distinguished Edwards by explaining that “[u]nlike searches of the 
person, searches of possessions within an arrestee’s immediate control 
cannot be justified by any reduced expectations of privacy caused by the 
arrest.”165 The Court further explained: 
Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other 
personal property not immediately associated with the person of 
the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any 
danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a 
weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer 
an incident of the arrest.166 
The Court’s decisions in Edwards and Chadwick thus offer two different 
rules for the temporal scope of searches incident to arrest. If the search is of 
items associated with the person, police have great flexibility and can 
conduct the search many hours after arrest. If, however, the police search 
possessions that are not associated with the person and are merely nearby, 
then there is a more rigid time limitation. In the three and a half decades 
since the Edwards and Chadwick decisions, the Supreme Court has offered no 
additional guidance on this distinction. There are, however, a few relatively 
clear, decipherable principles from lower court decisions. 
Lower courts have repeatedly concluded that, in addition to clothing, 
police may search an arrestee’s wallet incident to arrest at the station house 
because a wallet conceptually falls under Edwards as an item typically found 
on the person of an arrestee and thus closer to clothing than, for example, 
the footlocker in Chadwick.167 Similarly, courts have upheld station house 
 
 161. See id. at 805–09. 
 162. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 4 (1977). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 5. 
 165. Id. at 16 n.10 (citations omitted). 
 166. Id. at 15. 
 167. See United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776, 778 (7th Cir. 1993) (allowing search of 
wallet and the address book inside of it at the station house and citing Edwards); United States v. 
McEachern, 675 F.2d 618, 622 (4th Cir. 1982) (approving search incident to arrest of wallet at 
police station); United States v. Baldwin, 644 F.2d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 1981) (upholding search 
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searches incident to arrest of purses,168 duffle bags,169 and backpacks170 
because they more closely resemble items on the person rather than nearby 
possessions. As Professor Wayne LaFave observed in his influential treatise, 
courts have “rather consistently” held that under Edwards police can search 
 
incident to arrest at station house of wallet “a few hours” after arrest under Edwards); United 
States v. Passaro, 624 F.2d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding search of wallet at police 
station under Edwards because a wallet is much closer to a person than a footlocker or a 
briefcase); United States v. Castro, 596 F.2d 674, 677 (5th Cir. 1979) (relying on Edwards to 
permit police to read papers in wallet during station house search); Chambers v. State, 422 
N.E.2d 1198, 1203 (Ind. 1981) (upholding search incident to arrest of wallet at station because 
it “was immediately associated with the person of appellant” and thus cannot fall under 
Chadwick); People v. Knight, 333 N.W.2d 94, 95, 98 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding search 
of defendant’s wallet incident to arrest at police station, though conducting no analysis of the 
issue); State v. Rodewald, 376 N.W.2d 416, 419 (Minn. 1985) (“A wallet is not akin to the 
container in Chadwick since it is immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.”); 
People v. Blankymsee, 764 N.Y.S.2d 331, 334 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (concluding without analysis that 
drugs found in defendant’s wallet during search at precinct station was permissible under 
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine); State v. Garcia, 665 P.2d 1381, 1382–83 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1983) (upholding search incident to arrest of wallet at station house); Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 
478, 484 (Wyo. 1988) (upholding search of wallet while defendant was being held in detention 
at a hospital, under Edwards). 
 168. See, e.g., United States v. Venizelos, 495 F. Supp. 1277, 1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“[A 
handbag was property immediately associated with the person because it was small and within 
the arrestee’s grasp and because] [i]t carried items normally closely associated with the person 
itself [including] identification, cosmetics, money, a wallet, and other items one would 
normally carry at all times. Indeed, it is reasonable to suppose that had it not been seized at the 
time of the arrest, the defendant probably would have brought the handbag with her to the 
DEA district office for identification and to assist in ‘booking . . . .’”); People v. Harris, 164 Cal. 
Rptr. 296 (Ct. App. 1980) (authorizing station house search of purse and wallet contained 
therein because California law considers a purse to be a normal extension of the person); 
People v. Thomas, 760 N.E.2d 1012 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (finding search at police station to be 
consistent with Edwards); People v. Mannozzi, 632 N.E.2d 627, 632 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“[A] 
purse, unlike a footlocker, has been held to be an item immediately associated with the person 
of an arrestee, because it is carried on the person at all times.”); Preston v. State, 784 A.2d 601, 
608 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (rejecting delayed search of automobile but recognizing that 
courts considering the question have generally concluded that a purse, like a wallet, is an object 
“immediately associated with the person”); State v. Greene, 785 S.W.2d 574, 577 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1990) (upholding station house search of purse because “a woman’s purse is, like the arrestee’s 
clothes in Edwards, more immediately associated with the person of the accused than is other 
personal property, such as luggage or an attache case” (internal quotation mark omitted)); 
State v. Woods, 637 S.W.2d 113, 116 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (same); State v. Wade, 573 N.W.2d 
228 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (relying on Edwards to authorize search incident to arrest of purse at 
police station). 
 169. See United States v. Morales, 549 F. Supp. 217, 224 & n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (concluding 
without explanation that a duffle bag was immediately associated with the person and that it 
could be searched after arrest at the police headquarters). 
 170. See People v. Boff, 766 P.2d 646, 651 n.9 (Colo. 1988) (en banc) (offering detailed 
analysis of Edwards and Chadwick and concluding that backpack could be searched at station 
incident to arrest because it “is more like a purse than a two-hundred pound double-locked 
footlocker”); id. at 651 (“A search at the police station of a suspect, his clothes, and personal 
property immediately associated with his person, is justified to the same extent that such a 
search could have been made at the time and place of arrest.”). 
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incident to arrest the “pockets, wallet, [and] other containers on the 
person” at the station house following arrest.171 To the extent conflicting 
authority finds items as possessions falling under Chadwick, the cases typically 
involve purses and briefcases found in the arrestee’s vehicle or otherwise not 
attached to the arrestee’s body.172 
As explained in Part III.C.2 below, the fact that wallets, purses, and 
other items on the arrestee are almost universally considered part of the 
person, and are thus searchable incident to arrest hours later at the station 
house, strongly suggests that cell phones stored on an arrestee should fall 
into this category as well. 
2. Cell Phones Will Often Be Items Associated with the Person, Giving 
Police a Lengthy Time To Search 
To determine how long police can spend trying to crack a cell-phone 
password, courts must first decide whether the phone falls under Edwards or 
Chadwick. Most courts deciding searches incident to arrest of cell phones 
have not addressed this question, and those that have undertaken the task 
have reached conflicting results. 
A few courts have held that cell phones constitute possessions associated 
with the person of an arrestee under Edwards, and that law-enforcement 
officers have flexibility in the time it takes them to search the phones 
incident to arrest. Once again, the key case supporting this approach is the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Finley.173 In Finley, police arrested 
the defendant at a traffic stop and then transported him to a coconspirator’s 
house where the police were executing a search.174 At this new location, 
DEA agents searched Finley’s cell phone and found evidence linking him to 
a drug conspiracy.175 Citing Edwards, the Finley court rejected the argument 
that the search of Finley’s cell phone was too far removed from his arrest.176 
The court specifically held that Finley’s phone should not fall into the 
 
 171. See LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 5.3(a), at 146 (footnotes omitted) (citing numerous 
cases). 
 172. See, e.g., United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1286 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(rejecting search incident to arrest of purse at the stationhouse an hour after arrest when purse 
was “either in her hand, on her lap, or on the seat of the car at the time of arrest”); United 
States v. Calandrella, 605 F.2d 236, 247–50 (6th Cir. 1979) (concluding briefcase was an item 
within the arrestee’s immediate control and could not be searched later at the station under 
Edwards); United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166, 1170–72 (8th Cir. 1978) (same), overruled by 
United States v. Morales, 923 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1991); Kuhn v. State, 439 So. 2d 291, 295 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (rejecting station house search incident to arrest of briefcase found in 
arrestee’s truck); State v. Bushberger, No. 95-1140-CR, 1995 WL 581122, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Oct. 4, 1995) (concluding that briefcase found in backseat of vehicle could not be searched 
incident to arrest at the station). 
 173. 477 F.3d 250, 258–60 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 174. Id. at 253. 
 175. Id. at 254–55. 
 176. Id. at 260 n.7. 
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Chadwick category of property not immediately associated with the person of 
an arrestee because the cell phone “was on his person at the time of his 
arrest.”177 A handful of additional cases have reached the same conclusion 
and upheld searches of cell phones at a police station under the Edwards 
doctrine.178 
By contrast, the Park court concluded that cell phones fell under 
Chadwick, and rejected a search conducted ninety minutes after arrest at the 
police station. It concluded that cell phones “should be considered 
‘possessions within an arrestee’s immediate control’ and not part of ‘the 
person,’”179 ultimately explaining: 
[C]ellular phones have the capacity for storing immense amounts 
of private information. Unlike pagers or address books, modern 
cell phones record incoming and outgoing calls, and can also 
contain address books, calendars, voice and text messages, email, 
video and pictures. Individuals can store highly personal 
information on their cell phones, and can record their most private 
thoughts and conversations on their cell phones through email and 
text, voice and instant messages.180 
Thus, the court concluded that the search of Park’s cell phone at the station 
house ninety minutes after arrest could not be justified under the search-
incident-to-arrest doctrine.181 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 412 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Wurie, 
612 F. Supp. 2d 104, 110 (D. Mass. 2009) (“I see no principled basis for distinguishing a 
warrantless search of a cell phone from the search of other types of personal containers found 
on a defendant’s person that fall within the [Edwards] exception[] to the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonableness requirements.”); United States v. Curry, Criminal No. 07-100-P-H, 2008 WL 
219966, at *10 (D. Me. Jan. 23, 2008); United States v. Diaz, No. CR 05-0167 WHA, 2006 WL 
3193770, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2006); People v. Diaz, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215, 217–18 (Ct. App. 
2008); see also United States v. Lynch, 908 F. Supp. 284, 289 (D.V.I. 1995) (relying on Edwards 
and concluding that a pager was immediately associated with the arrestee). A number of other 
courts have upheld searches at the station house, although with no discussion of the Chadwick–
Edwards distinction. See Brady v. Gonzalez, No. 08 C 5916, 2009 WL 1952774, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
July 2, 2009); United States v. Brookes, No. CRIM 2004-0154, 2005 WL 1940124, at *1 (D.V.I. 
June 16, 2005); United States v. Cote, No. 03CR271, 2005 WL 1323343, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 
26, 2005). 
 179. United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 
2007) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1977)). 
 180. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 181. See id. at *9. In the only other case to adopt the Park court’s reasoning, prosecutors 
conceded that a seized cell phone was not an element of the defendant’s clothing when it was 
seized. See United States v. Lasalle, Cr. No. 07-00032, 2007 WL 1390820 (D. Haw. May 9, 
2007). In Lasalle, agents searched Lasalle’s cell phone at the DEA office “somewhere between 
two hours and fifteen minutes to three hours and forty-five minutes” after his arrest. Id. at *7. 
The court concluded that “[g]iven the time period and physical distance between the arrest 
and search, the search was not ‘at about the same time of the arrest’ or ‘roughly 
contemporaneous’ with the arrest.” Id.; see also United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR, 2008 
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In the battle between the Finley line of reasoning that cell phones are 
associated with the person of the arrestee and the Park view that phones are 
nearby possessions, the Park court appears to have the weaker argument. 
First, and quite bizarrely, the Park court concluded that the cell phone could 
not be associated with the person of an arrestee even though police 
physically removed it from his person at booking.182 As detailed above, 
courts have repeatedly held that wallets found in arrestees’ pockets (as well 
as purses and backpacks on an arrestee) should be considered items 
associated with the person of the arrestee, which can be searched at the 
station house under Edwards.183 When police find a cell phone in an 
arrestee’s pocket, precedent therefore strongly suggests it should be 
searchable at the station house. 
Second, the Park court took the position that cell phones are 
possessions within the arrestee’s immediate control because they contain a 
wealth of private information. However, the court offered no explanation as 
to why the quantity of information held in a phone had anything to do with 
whether it was associated with an arrestee’s person or was merely a nearby 
possession. If storing a large quantity of information precludes an item from 
being associated with the person of an arrestee, then arguably the clothing 
in Edwards should not have qualified for such a designation. After all, 
Edwards’s clothing revealed that he had been at the crime scene and 
modern technology could provide detailed analysis linking fiber samples to 
the crime. Or consider the enormous amount of information police can 
obtain from searching a wallet—generally held to be associated with the 
person of an arrestee—including where the arrestee banks (via his ATM 
card); where he shops (via his rewards cards); whether he has any medical 
conditions (via medical cards); pictures of his children; and more 
scandalous information such as motel key cards, condoms, or the phone 
number of his mistress. These items do not cease to be on the person of an 
arrestee simply because they convey a wealth of information. 
Moreover, the idea that an electronic container cannot be associated 
with the person of an arrestee is inconsistent with the use of cell phones in 
everyday life. Many people exercise with an MP3 player (including iPhones) 
securely strapped to their biceps.184 It is difficult to comprehend how a cell 
phone that is literally attached to an arrestee’s arm could not be associated 
 
WL 5381412, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2008) (rejecting a search of a cell phone at a police 
station because “it was not contemporaneous with the arrest,” although not discussing Edwards 
or Chadwick), aff’d, 343 F. App’x 564 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
 182. 2007 WL 1521573, at *2. 
 183. See supra notes 167–70 and accompanying text. 
 184. For one of the dozens of versions of this product, see Tune Belt Sport Armband for iPhone 
3GS, iPhone 4 and More, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/Tune-Belt-Armband-iPhone-
Blackberry/dp/B002NL2WYQ/ref=sr_1_1?s=mp3&ie=UTF8&qid=1278100000&sr=1-1 (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2011). 
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with the person of an arrestee.185 Yet, under the Park court’s reasoning, even 
cell phones that are physically strapped onto an arrestee’s body could never 
be associated with the person of the arrestee because they contain so much 
data. 
The problem with the Park decision is that it embraces a bright-line rule 
in which all cell phones should constitute nearby possessions and can never 
be items associated with the arrestee’s person. In some instances, such as 
when police find a phone in a briefcase or sitting on the front passenger seat 
of a vehicle, it makes sense to say a cell phone is a possession near the 
arrestee. In cases where the cell phone is in the arrestee’s pocket, attached 
to his arm, or clipped to his belt, it is far less compelling to suggest that the 
phone is never associated with the person of an arrestee. 
In short, there is no easy, all-purpose answer to the question of whether 
a cell phone should be considered an item associated with the person of an 
arrestee or merely a nearby possession. The categorization depends on the 
specific facts of the case. In some instances, police should be permitted to 
search a cell phone hours after arrest at the police station, whereas in other 
cases such elongated searches should be forbidden. 
3. If Cell Phones Are Merely Possessions, How Long Can Police Spend 
Searching Them Before the Search Ceases 
To Be Contemporaneous? 
It is easy to see why the Edwards–Chadwick issue has gathered 
considerable attention in the debate over searching cell phones incident to 
arrest.186 If a cell phone is part of the person, then police should be 
permitted to take it to the station and conduct a warrantless search for hours 
after arrest. Accordingly, observers may instinctually be reluctant to place 
cell phones in the Edwards box, which gives police wide search latitude. Yet, 
categorizing cell phones as possessions near an arrestee that fall under 
Chadwick does not end the analysis. Police may still search such nearby items 
incident to arrest as long as the search is contemporaneous. If the phones 
fall under Chadwick, the key question—and the question that is too often 
ignored by courts in the cell-phone context—is how long police have to 
conduct the search. Are officers limited to five minutes after arrest, or can 
they take much longer? Unfortunately, there is no clear answer to this 
question. 
 
 185. It is common to hear the metaphor that people are so addicted to their cell phones 
that the phones are attached to them. It is possible, though, that this derogatory metaphor 
might one day become a reality. Although farfetched in 2011, it is plausible that in the near 
future a wireless device could be surgically attached to a person’s forearm so that the Internet 
would, quite literally, always be at his fingertips. Under the Park court’s reasoning, however, the 
phone would remain a nearby possession falling under Chadwick. 
 186. See Orso, supra note 52, at 203–06; Stillwagon, supra note 88, at 1192–94. 
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Although the Supreme Court has trumpeted the need for bright-line 
rules in the search-incident-to-arrest context, the Court has not adopted a 
bright-line rule dictating how long police can take to conduct such 
searches.187 Not surprisingly, lower court decisions often appear to be 
completely inconsistent with one another. Perhaps for this reason academic 
commentators have failed to offer even a presumptive rule (such as the idea 
that searches within thirty minutes of arrest are typically contemporaneous, 
while longer time delays are usually impermissible)188 because there are too 
many outlying decisions that would undercut such a presumption.189 
Accordingly, police must be guided by high-level principles offering 
little practical guidance. The overarching concept provides simply that 
police must conduct a search as soon as is practicable. Courts are willing to 
uphold searches taking longer periods of time when there are intervening 
events,190 like when police must wait for additional officers to secure the 
scene.191 If the search appears to be part of a “continuous series of 
events,”192 rather than an afterthought, courts are more likely to uphold the 
 
 187. Over twenty-five years ago, Professor Albert Alschuler criticized the Court for failing to 
create any rule as to what constitutes “contemporaneous with arrest.” See Albert W. Alschuler, 
Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 281–82 (1984) (“[T]he 
Court offered no basis for determining whether a search conducted thirty minutes or an hour 
after an arrest would remain a ‘contemporaneous incident.’ This sort of uncertainty may be 
more troublesome than the uncertainty inherent in a system of case-by-case adjudication . . . .”). 
The problem persists to this day. See Logan, supra note 153, at 412 n.189 (citing United States v. 
McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 1999) (“There is no fixed outer limit for the number 
of minutes that may pass between an arrest and a valid, warrantless search that is a 
contemporaneous incident of the arrest.”)). 
 188. Compare United States v. Weaver, 433 F.3d 1104, 1110 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding 
search after ten- to fifteen-minute delay, though reiterating that “time alone is never dispositive 
of the contemporaneity inquiry”), People v. Malloy, 178 P.3d 1283, 1287 (Colo. App. 2008) 
(upholding search occurring a little over thirty minutes after arrest), and State v. Hernandez, 
113 P.3d 437, 438 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding search occurring twenty to thirty minutes 
after arrest), with United States v. $639,558 in U.S. Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 716–17, 716 n.7 
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (rejecting search-incident-to-arrest doctrine for a search conducted between 
thirty and sixty-three minutes after arrest), and United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 787–88 
(9th Cir. 1987) (search of automobile thirty to forty-five minutes after arrest was too long to be 
incident to arrest). 
 189. See, e.g., United States v. Hrasky, 453 F.3d 1099 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding search 
occurring more than one hour after arrest, although over vigorous dissent); State v. Barksdale, 
540 A.2d 901, 907 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (finding search more than ten minutes 
after arrest to be “anything but ‘a contemporaneous incident of that arrest’”). 
 190. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (“Some 
courts consider whether the ‘arresting officers conducted the search as soon as it was practical 
to do so,’ or if there were any intervening acts occurring before the search, unrelated to the 
search.” (quoting McLaughlin, 170 F.3d at 892)). 
 191. See State v. Ullock, No. 93-1874-CR, 1994 WL 100324 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1994) 
(upholding search incident to arrest forty minutes after arrest because officer was alone on the 
scene and had good reason to wait for another individual to arrive on the scene before leaving 
the arrestee unsupervised). 
 192. United States v. Smith, 389 F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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search. Indeed, many courts will even give police leeway to conduct a search 
incident to arrest after officers remove an arrestee from the scene, so long as 
there is a good reason for the delay and the police conduct the search 
expeditiously.193 
While courts have refused to draw bright-line time limits on searches 
incident to arrest, the contours of the caselaw suggest that an outer time 
limit exists. It is easy to locate hundreds of (non-cell-phone) cases in which 
courts permitted searches incident to arrest five, ten, twenty, and even sixty 
minutes after arrest.194 But very few cases address searches that occur more 
than an hour after arrest.195 The absence of such cases suggests that there 
truly is an implicit outer limit on the time police have to conduct searches 
incident to arrest. 
4. Will Police Have Enough Time To Crack the Password? 
The key remaining question is whether, practically speaking, police will 
be able to successfully crack a cell-phone password while complying with the 
time limits of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine. The answer to this 
question likely turns on where the cell phone is located when the owner is 
arrested. If a cell phone is found on an arrestee or in his pocket it should be 
considered part of his person, giving police the power to bring it to the 
station and search it even hours after the arrest. If police discover a cell 
phone within the grabbing space of an arrestee, such as in a briefcase or 
lying on the passenger seat of an automobile, they still may search it but 
typically must do so at the scene and likely within minutes, or at most an 
hour, of the arrest. Thus, police may have a short period of time to try to 
crack the password of a cell phone found near an arrestee, and they may 
have a considerably longer period of time to crack the password of a cell 
phone found in an arrestee’s pocket. As explained below, they will have 
trouble doing the former but could accomplish the latter. 
If police must search a cell phone on the scene and have only a few 
minutes to do so, a password will likely prevent the police from accessing the 
phone’s contents. In most cases, police simply will not be able to decipher a 
 
 193. Compare McLaughlin, 170 F.3d at 892 (upholding a search that officers began five 
minutes after arrestee was removed from the scene and continued for eleven minutes until the 
officer discovered contraband), and United States v. Doward, 41 F.3d 789 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(upholding search incident to arrest begun three minutes after individual was placed under 
arrest and thirty seconds after he had been driven from the scene), with United States v. 
Dennison, 410 F.3d 1203, 1209 (10th Cir. 2005) (“A search incident to arrest is unlawful when 
a suspect is arrested, removed from the scene, and en route to the police station when the 
search of the arrestee’s passenger compartment begins.”). 
 194. See V.G. Lewter, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule as to Validity of Nonconsensual Search 
and Seizure Made Without Warrant After Lawful Arrest as Affected by Lapse of Time Between, or Difference 
in Places of, Arrest and Search, 19 A.L.R.3d 727 (1968). 
 195. See, e.g., People v. Landry, 80 Cal. Rptr. 880, 884 (Ct. App. 1969) (rejecting search 
occurring one hour and fifteen minutes after arrest). 
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password during the commotion of an arrest. That said, it is possible that 
police could guess the password in some cases. One in five Americans uses 
an overly simplistic password such as “123456,” and an officer might simply 
get lucky by trying the most common passwords.196 Officers also have access 
to an arrestee’s driver’s license, which contains his birth date and home 
address—both of which are commonly used as passwords. Thus, while the 
chance of an officer cracking the password in a short time on the scene is 
limited, it is possible. 
In the cases where police bring the cell phone to the station house 
because it is considered part of the arrestee’s person in that jurisdiction, the 
chances of cracking the password increase dramatically, particularly for 
certain phones. Take the iPhone as an example. The iPhone’s password 
function offers three key protections: (1) a four-digit numerical code; (2) a 
requirement that consecutively entered incorrect passwords disable the 
phone for a short period before the user can try another password; and (3) 
the option to have the contents of the phone deleted if the incorrect 
password is entered ten times.197 Unfortunately, these protections are 
extremely weak. 
A four-digit numerical code provides only 10,000 combinations. While 
this might prevent most human guessing, it would not stop a brute-force 
computer program that sequentially inputs every numerical combination.198 
If law enforcement utilized a very simple computer program to try all 10,000 
combinations in a row, they would be able to crack the password in minutes. 
While police stations likely do not currently have such programs at their 
fingertips, it is quite possible they will in the near future as technology 
becomes more ubiquitous. 
Moreover, even if police never set up the program to crack passwords, 
they may be able to bypass the password altogether by hacking into the 
phone. One well-known computer hacker has authored a book called iPhone 
Forensics, which explains how to remove data from the phone.199 The same 
hacker proudly advertises that he teaches courses on the topic to law-
enforcement agencies, including lessons on bypassing pass codes.200 
Even if police agencies lack the money or time to enroll any of their 
officers in computer-forensics classes, they can turn to numerous Internet 
 
 196. See Vance, supra note 12 (noting that one percent of 32 million passwords stolen by a 
hacker were “123456” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 197. See Jeff Richardson, A Look at the iPhone Passcode Lock Feature, IPHONE J.D. (Sept. 28, 
2009), http://www.iphonejd.com/iphone_jd/2009/09/iphone-passcode-lock.html. 
 198. Joe Kissell, Top Password Tips: Foolproof Ways To Create, Remember and Manage Passwords, 
MACWORLD, Sept. 1, 2009, 2009 WLNR 26376198; Jay Sartori, iPhone Passcode Bugs Revealed, 
NETWORK WORLD, Sept. 2, 2009, 2009 WLNR 17527305. 
 199. See JONATHAN ZDZIARSKI, IPHONE FORENSICS: RECOVERING EVIDENCE, PERSONAL DATA & 
CORPORATE ASSETS (2008). 
 200. See Amber Hunt, Latest Police Weapon: iWitness?, USA TODAY, July 8, 2010, at 1A. 
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videos that show users how to access data on iPhones.201 For some older 
versions of the phone, police only need to tinker with the device itself to 
bypass the password function altogether in a matter of moments. For newer 
versions of the iPhone (that have closed earlier loopholes), police can still 
hack into the phone using only a laptop, iTunes, and open-source forensic 
recovery software.202 Even police departments with limited funds can 
scrounge up a laptop computer, and even inexperienced hackers can follow 
the simple directions posted on the Internet to bypass the password. 
In the comfort of the police station, police could therefore gain access 
to the data on a password-protected cell phone in a matter of minutes. And 
while the iPhone only accounts for a sixteen percent share of the cell-phone 
market currently,203 other popular cell phones also utilize four-digit pass 
codes that offer similarly limited protection.204 
*     *     * 
At bottom, the fact that a phone is password protected does not legally 
or practically prevent it from being searched. Password protecting a cell 
phone places limited legal roadblocks in law enforcement’s path—making it 
difficult to search the phone at the scene of arrest—but does not prevent 
quick searches at the scene or lengthier investigations at the station house. 
And while passwords appear to provide great protection that might deter law 
enforcement, with minimal effort police may be able to decipher or bypass 
the password to gain access to a phone’s contents. 
IV. THE IPHONE MEETS THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
As detailed in Part III, the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine provides 
police with the opportunity to guess or crack a cell phone’s password in an 
effort to search it. What happens, however, if police are unable to break into 
the phone on their own? Can police ask or even demand that an arrestee 
enter the password himself or verbally provide it to the police? As explained 
 
 201. There are dozens of videos available on YouTube demonstrating how to bypass the 
iPhone’s pass code. See, e.g., MrNerveGas, Removing iPhone 3G[s] Passcode and Encryption, 
YOUTUBE (July 24, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5wS3AMbXRLs; TatesMan, How 
To Bypass iPhone’s Passcode, YOUTUBE (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OBU 
DSsp5U-4&feature=related. 
 202. See ZDZIARSKI, supra note 199, at 19–42 (offering step-by-step instructions for using the 
iLiberty+ program to avoid the prohibition on installing software not signed by Apple and to 
thereafter install a forensic-recovery toolkit that will permit law enforcement to extract data 
from the phone). 
 203. See Antone Gonsalves, Apple iPhone Gains Market Share, BlackBerry Slips, 
INFORMATIONWEEK (May 10, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/news/ 
mobility/smart_phones/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=224701204. 
 204. See, e.g., VERIZON WIRELESS, VOYAGER USER GUIDE 116–18 (describing how to utilize 
“four-digit lock code”), available at http://www.lg.com/us/mobile-phones/pdf/Voyager_UG_ 
E_1.3.pdf. 
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below, while the law is complicated, in many cases police will be able to 
obtain the password without running afoul of the Fifth Amendment. If 
police request the password from an arrestee who is in custody, they have 
likely engaged in an interrogation that requires Miranda warnings. Yet, 
because the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine does not apply to evidence 
discovered as a result of Miranda violations, police who fail to comply with 
Miranda suffer no consequences. As Part IV.B explains, if arrestees turn over 
their password in response to a police demand (as opposed to a voluntary 
request), the arrestee has only a weak argument that the police have violated 
the Fifth Amendment by compelling incriminating information. Moreover, 
many arrestees will never reach this point because they will consensually 
relinquish their password well in advance of a police demand. 
A. THE MIRANDA DOCTRINE MAY PROTECT AGAINST REQUESTS FOR PASSWORDS, 
BUT VIOLATIONS WILL NOT LEAD TO THE SUPPRESSION OF 
VALUABLE EVIDENCE 
The Miranda doctrine applies when an individual is in custody and 
subject to interrogation.205 The interrogation element is easily satisfied. 
When a police officer asks an individual, “What is your password?” the 
inquiry constitutes an interrogation.206 Moreover, even if the officer is clever 
enough to avoid phrasing the matter as a question (for instance, “Please tell 
me the password”), the Supreme Court has recognized that such functional 
equivalents of questioning amount to an interrogation if they are designed 
to elicit an incriminating response.207 Accordingly, requesting that an 
arrestee voluntarily turn over the password to his phone (which may 
inculpate him by leading to evidence on the phone) amounts to 
interrogation. 
The custody question is slightly more complicated. Although the 
Supreme Court has adopted different tests for determining whether a 
person is under arrest and whether they are in custody for Miranda 
purposes,208 it seems clear that an individual is in custody if he has been 
 
 205. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
 206. In Rhode Island v. Innis, the Supreme Court held that interrogation includes either 
express questioning or the functional equivalent of express questioning when the police should 
know the interaction is likely to elicit an incriminating response. 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980). 
In the case’s aftermath, some courts have held that express questioning not likely to elicit an 
incriminating response did not amount to interrogation. See Meghan S. Skelton & James G. 
Connell, III, The Routine Booking Question Exception to Miranda, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 55, 69–71 
(2004). These holdings, however, appear to be a misreading of Innis, as the decision appears to 
indicate that all express questioning (whether or not it is likely to elicit an incriminating 
response) amounts to interrogation. See id. at 77. 
 207. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300–01. 
 208. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Constitutes an “Arrest” Within the Meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 129, 173 (2003) (“[T]he concept of custody under Miranda and 
the Fourth Amendment’s measurement of what constitutes an arrest are not equivalent.”). 
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formally subjected to a full-scale custodial arrest.209 Thus, if an officer 
requests the password to a phone during a search incident to arrest, the 
arrestee is also in custody for Miranda purposes. 
One small wrinkle remains. The search-incident-to-arrest doctrine can 
apply even before an individual has been subjected to a custodial arrest.210 
In these circumstances, if police ask for a password as they begin searching a 
cell phone, but before they formally arrest an individual, the government 
might be able to argue that the individual was not yet in custody and 
therefore not entitled to Miranda warnings. In such a scenario, we would 
revert back to the general custodial standard that asks whether a reasonable 
person in the individual’s shoes would perceive that his “freedom of action 
[was] curtailed to a ‘degree associated with a formal arrest.’”211 
It is, of course, possible to imagine a scenario in which an officer begins 
to search a phone before a reasonable person would realize that he is about 
to be arrested and transported to the police station. For example, an officer 
who stops a driver with reason to believe he is involved in a drug ring (and 
who sees the driver actively pushing buttons on his phone as the officer 
approaches the vehicle) might immediately grab the phone and request the 
password in the hope of preventing evidence from being destroyed before 
the arrestee is handcuffed and placed in the squad car. In this situation, the 
soon-to-be-arrested driver might not reasonably think he is in custody, and 
thus he would not be entitled to Miranda warnings even though a search 
incident to arrest is in fact underway. 
While the above hypothetical is plausible, it seems quite unlikely. In 
drug cases, police almost always handcuff and secure arrestees immediately 
to protect their safety.212 Thus, the number of instances in which an officer 
searches a phone incident to arrest and requests a password before formally 
placing the individual under arrest and in custody for Miranda purposes is 
likely to be extremely low. As such, when police request that an arrestee 
voluntarily turn over his cell-phone password, the arrestee is subject to 
 
 209. See George E. Dix, Nonarrest Investigatory Detentions in Search and Seizure Law, 1985 DUKE 
L.J. 849, 927 (“Miranda does apply to custodial—that is, ‘arrest’—interrogations, even for 
minor offenses.” (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441 (1984))). 
 210. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980) (“Where the formal arrest followed 
quickly on the heels of the challenged search of petitioner’s person, we do not believe it 
particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa.”). For 
trenchant criticism of allowing searches to precede arrest, see Logan, supra note 153, at 405–
14. 
 211. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) 
(per curiam)). 
 212. See Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason: An Empirical Reexamination of Chimel 
and Belton, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 657, 665–66 (surveying California police agencies and 
documenting that “in general, police officers are taught to handcuff an arrestee (preferably 
behind his back) before searching the area around him”). 
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custodial interrogation and any request for the password must be preceded 
by Miranda warnings. 
Yet, as in many other cases, the Miranda requirement is a hollow 
protection, because the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine213 does not 
apply to Miranda violations.214 While a confession that violates Miranda will 
be suppressed, evidence found thereafter is admissible. If police obtain an 
arrestee’s password in violation of Miranda, an officer’s statement conceding 
knowledge of the password will be inadmissible, but any valuable resulting 
evidence—for instance, incriminating text messages or child pornography 
found on the phone—will be admissible. 
B. POLICE DEMANDS FOR THE PASSWORD LIKELY DO NOT AMOUNT TO A VIOLATION 
OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT’S SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE 
A final problem worthy of attention is what happens if police demand 
(rather than request) that an arrestee provide his password and the arrestee 
complies out of a belief that he has no choice. In this scenario, have police 
compelled an arrestee to incriminate himself with a testimonial response in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination? 
Although the law is murky, the answer is probably “no.” 
To assert a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination challenge, an individual 
must demonstrate that (1) he has been compelled (2) to produce testimony 
(3) that is incriminating.215 Taking the elements out of order, it is simple to 
satisfy the incrimination requirement. Although a password will almost never 
be incriminating by itself, the information it protects often will be. For over 
half a century, the Supreme Court has recognized that Fifth Amendment 
protection applies not only to responses that are themselves incriminating, 
but also to information that “would furnish a link in the chain of evidence 
needed to prosecute the claimant.”216 If providing the password leads to 
incriminating information, this element is satisfied. 
It is much more challenging for a defendant to demonstrate the 
compulsion element. Ordinarily, when one thinks of a person being 
compelled to incriminate herself, it is not via police interrogation, but 
instead in the context of a grand-jury subpoena. Indeed, when police 
officers interrogate a suspect they lack the legal authority to compel the 
individual to say anything. As a result, it is not surprising that the only two 
 
 213. Under the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, evidence found as a result of a 
constitutional violation is (subject to a few exceptions) not admissible. 
 214. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
 215. See Susan W. Brenner, Constitutional Rights and New Technologies in the United States, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 225, 231 (Ronald E. 
Leenes et al. eds., 2008). 
 216. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). 
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cases in which defendants have been compelled to disclose their computer 
passwords have been in response to grand-jury subpoenas.217 
The idea that police cannot compel incriminating testimony is further 
supported by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Chavez v. Martinez.218 
In Chavez, a plurality of the Court concluded that an individual who had 
been inappropriately interrogated could not raise a self-incrimination claim 
in a civil-rights lawsuit because the Government never filed criminal charges 
against him, and therefore he had not been forced to incriminate himself in 
a criminal case in violation of the Fifth Amendment.219 Put differently, while 
police might have compelled information from Chavez, they did not do so 
for Fifth Amendment purposes because the protection against self-
incrimination applies only to testimony used in criminal cases. 
Further supporting the position that police cannot compel testimony is 
the fact that for the last century, cases alleging police misconduct during 
interrogations have almost universally been analyzed under the Miranda 
doctrine or under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process 
Clauses, not the Self-Incrimination Clause.220 
A contrary argument in favor of police authority to compel an 
incriminating response can be imagined by citing to the Supreme Court’s 
1897 decision in Bram v. United States, in which the Court recognized that 
the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause protects against police 
interrogation.221 Add to that decision the fact that the Supreme Court 
adopted the Miranda doctrine largely because of the view that custodial 
interrogations are inherently compelling, and one can argue that police can 
compel an incriminating response.222 The prospect of the police badgering 
an arrestee or demanding information to which they are not legally entitled 
seems like exactly the type of coercive situation the Fifth Amendment is 
intended to protect against. To suggest that police should be able to slide 
between the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause (because they are 
 
 217. United States v. Kirschner, Misc No. 09-MC-50872, 2010 WL 1257355 (E.D. Mich. 
Mar. 30, 2010); In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). 
 218. 538 U.S. 760 (2003). 
 219. Id. at 773 (plurality opinion). 
 220. If police cannot compel a password in violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause, an 
arrestee’s only recourse would be to argue that any evidence is inadmissible because it was 
involuntarily coerced in violation of due process. As such, the arrestee would have to point to 
force, threat of force, or extreme psychological trickery to prevail. If all the arrestee can point 
to are persistent, but polite, police demands that the arrestee turn over the password, an 
involuntariness challenge will almost certainly fail. 
 221. 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
 222. Indeed, in Miranda, the dissenting justices unsuccessfully maintained that the Fifth 
Amendment should not apply to police interrogations because police lacked the contempt 
power to compel answers. See Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege 
Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part II), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 
497, 530 (1992) (describing dissenting opinions of Justices Harlan and White). 
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not judicial officers) and the Due Process Clauses (because their demands 
for the password are not so forceful as to coerce the defendant) is contrary 
to the expressed purpose behind the Miranda doctrine. 
While the police-compulsion argument has some allure, it is ultimately 
unpersuasive. In their book on police interrogation, Professors George 
Thomas and Richard Leo declined to discuss the Self-Incrimination Clause: 
Our book is about the law of interrogation. What the Fifth 
Amendment contributes to the law of interrogation is Miranda. . . . 
[I]t is fair to say that, as far as the law of police interrogation in the 
United States is concerned, there is Miranda and there is the due 
process prohibition of involuntary confessions.223 
In short, while it may seem incongruous that police could demand a 
password without violating the Fifth Amendment, the reality is that the 
Court’s current jurisprudence makes Miranda the only Fifth Amendment 
remedy available to defendants. Accordingly, any self-incrimination claim 
arising out of a police demand for a cell-phone password should fail for lack 
of compulsion. 
Assuming (contrary to the discussion above) that a defendant could 
prove police compulsion, he would still have to demonstrate that declaring 
the password was testimonial to assert a successful self-incrimination claim. 
When an individual provides a password, courts should consider this a 
testimonial act, although the sheer complexity of the analysis might lead 
judges to misconstrue the law. 
Evidence is testimonial (and thus protected by the Fifth Amendment) if 
it causes an individual “to reveal, directly or indirectly, his knowledge of facts 
relating him to the offense or from having to share his thoughts and beliefs 
with the Government.”224 The Court has recognized that most verbal 
statements “convey information or assert facts” and therefore “[t]he vast 
majority of verbal statements thus will be testimonial.”225 By contrast, when 
an individual is not asked to reveal the contents of his mind, as when he 
displays physical characteristics like the sound of his voice or his physical 
appearance, the evidence is nontestimonial.226 Asking a suspected drunk 
driver if he has been drinking calls for a testimonial response, whereas 
taking a sample of his blood only represents a physical trait that is 
nontestimonial.227 
 
 223. See E-mail from George C. Thomas III, Bd. of Governors Professor of Law & Judge 
Alexander P. Waugh, Sr. Distinguished Scholar, Rutgers Sch. of Law–Newark, to Adam 
Gershowitz, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Hous. Law Ctr. (Sept. 6, 2010, 2:37 PM) (on file 
with author) (quoting GEORGE C. THOMAS III & RICHARD A. LEO, THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF 
INTERROGATIONS ch. 3 (forthcoming 2011)). 
 224. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 213 (1988). 
 225. Id. 
 226. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 594–95 (1990). 
 227. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966). 
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In light of frequently quoted dicta from a 1988 Supreme Court 
decision, it seems clear that asking an arrestee to disclose his password is 
testimonial. In Doe, the Court noted that forcing an arrestee to turn over the 
key to a strongbox containing incriminating documents would not be 
testimonial, whereas compelling him to turn over the combination to a wall 
safe would be.228 
The Court’s logic in Doe is not detailed or particularly persuasive, 
although it reaches the correct conclusion that reciting a password is 
testimonial. First, it is important to recognize that, contrary to the Court’s 
suggestion, turning over the key to a strongbox could also be testimonial. 
Courts have repeatedly held that producing tangible evidence, such as a 
murder weapon or a victim’s body, can be testimonial even in the absence of 
any verbal language.229 This is because producing such tangible evidence 
demonstrates the existence, control, and location of those items, which 
amounts to testimony.230 In the cell-phone context, this is significant 
because clever police officers could attempt to avoid a Fifth Amendment 
problem by demanding that an arrestee either provide a written copy of his 
password or simply enter the password himself without the officer seeing 
it.231 Indeed, in one of only two cases addressing the compulsion of 
computer passwords, prosecutors offered to have the individual enter his 
password without any onlookers, so that he would not have to make a 
testimonial statement in violation of the Fifth Amendment.232 The 
magistrate assigned to the case refused to accept this option, explaining that 
even entering the password privately would be testimonial because it would 
demonstrate knowledge of the password and access to the underlying 
computer files.233 
Despite the Supreme Court’s ill-advised comment that the key to a 
strongbox would not be testimonial, the Court was correct in concluding the 
combination to a safe is testimonial. Prosecutors might argue that a 
password is not testimonial because it does not convey an arrestee’s thoughts 
or beliefs, or cause him to reveal knowledge relating him to a criminal 
offense.234 This position is incorrect because providing the password would 
reveal the contents of an arrestee’s mind by recalling the password. Indeed, 
even if an arrestee only had to produce a preexisting copy of the password 
(e.g., one previously written on a post-it note or saved on a zip drive), the act 
of producing that item would demonstrate the existence and control of the 
 
 228. Doe, 487 U.S. at 210 n.9. 
 229. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hughes, 404 N.E.2d 1239, 1244–45 (Mass. 1980). 
 230. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976). 
 231. I am grateful to Professor Susan Brenner for making this point to me. 
 232. In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2 (D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007), rev’d, 
No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). 
 233. See id. at *4. 
 234. See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 213 (1988). 
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password, and by implication, an arrestee’s knowledge of the contents of the 
cell phone.235 Put simply, providing the password to a cell phone—whether 
from an individual’s mind, a post-it note in his pocket, or by inputting it with 
his own hand—should be considered testimonial. 
In sum, a police demand for an arrestee’s password can certainly be 
testimonial and incriminating, but the self-incrimination claim should 
probably fail because the defendant is unable to demonstrate compulsion. 
Accordingly, an arrestee who turned over his password in response to police 
demands has, at best, a very weak argument that his Fifth Amendment 
protection against self-incrimination has been violated.236 Moreover, even if 
a court reaches a contrary conclusion on the compulsion question and thus 
finds a self-incrimination violation, there are at least three additional 
reasons to believe Fifth Amendment protection of the password is of 
minimal value. 
First, most arrestees will never be in a position to assert a self-
incrimination claim because they will have revealed the password voluntarily. 
If police simply ask, rather than demand, that an arrestee enter the password 
to his phone and he consents, there is no compulsion and hence no Fifth 
Amendment violation. As explained above, while police should be obligated 
to read an arrestee his Miranda warnings before requesting his password, in 
reality, the warnings provide virtually no protection because individuals 
typically waive them.237 Moreover, even if police failed to read the warnings, 
the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine does not require suppression of 
evidence subsequently found on the phone. Only the statement identifying 
the password (a confession that, by itself, is nearly valueless in a criminal 
prosecution) would be suppressed.238 
Second, if an officer is unable to convince an arrestee to turn over the 
password consensually and badgers the arrestee to turn over the password 
enough that there is arguably compulsion under the Fifth Amendment, the 
State may nevertheless argue that the contents of the phone are not 
testimonial because they were a “foregone conclusion.” The Supreme Court 
has recognized that when police ask an individual to produce evidence that 
is already known to the Government (and thus a “foregone conclusion”), 
 
 235. See Susan Brenner, Miranda, the 5th Amendment, and Cell Phones, CYB3RCRIM3 (July 26, 
2010, 1:01 PM), http://cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.com/2010/07/miranda-5th-amendment-and-cell-
phones.html. 
 236. See 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
§ 22.03[C][2][b] (4th ed. 2006). 
 237. See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 276 
(1996) (finding that seventy-eight percent of suspects in a study of a major urban police 
department waived their Miranda rights). 
 238. See supra notes 213–14 and accompanying text. 
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the act of production is not testimonial.239 For example, the Government 
might argue that police observed an arrestee texting on his phone 
immediately before a drug bust and that it was apparent that the text 
messages were being used to facilitate drug deals. The prosecutor might 
therefore argue that any incriminating text messages were a foregone 
conclusion and that the password did not provide any unanticipated 
information, and thus the compelled evidence is not testimonial. 
The foregone-conclusion argument should fail in the vast majority of 
cases, because without knowing the specific contents of the phone, police 
are not in a position to say before the search what evidence will be found 
once the arrestee enters his password. Under the Supreme Court’s decision 
in United States v. Hubbell, a simple Government assertion that incriminating 
information exists is not sufficient to demonstrate a foregone conclusion.240 
In Hubbell, the Government asserted that a subpoena to a businessman to 
produce thousands of pages of business and tax documents was not 
testimonial because the existence and location of the documents was a 
foregone conclusion given that businessmen always possess general business 
and tax records.241 The Supreme Court rejected this argument on the 
grounds that its vague assertion failed to demonstrate the existence and 
whereabouts of the actual documents ultimately produced by Hubbell.242 
In light of the specificity required by Hubbell, prosecutors will likely be 
unsuccessful in making vague assertions that the contents of text messages 
on a cell phone are a foregone conclusion. With the exception of long-term 
investigations in which police know of specific information on the phone 
and simply lack the time to get a warrant, courts should reject the foregone-
conclusion doctrine. Nevertheless, because this area of law is complicated 
and murky, it would not be surprising to see courts incorrectly adopt the 
foregone-conclusion approach in borderline cases where police had some 
inclination that cell phones contained illegal, but unspecified, information. 
In the event that police find no incriminating information on an 
arrestee’s phone and do not bring criminal charges as a result of an arrestee 
turning over his password, there is a strong argument that truly innocent 
individuals have no civil-rights remedy because, under the Court’s decision 
in Chavez v. Martinez, Fifth Amendment claims are limited to “criminal 
cases.”243 In Chavez, an arrestee was shot by police and subsequently 
interrogated while receiving medical treatment, even though he had not 
 
 239. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976) (“The existence and location of the 
papers are a foregone conclusion and the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum total of the 
Government’s information by conceding that he in fact has the papers.”). 
 240. 530 U.S. 27, 44–45 (2000). 
 241. Id. at 44. 
 242. See id. at 44–46. 
 243. 538 U.S. 760, 764–65 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
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received his Miranda warnings.244 Chavez made incriminating statements, 
but he was never charged with a crime.245 In a subsequent civil-rights lawsuit 
against the police department, Chavez alleged a violation of his Fifth 
Amendment rights.246 The Supreme Court rejected Chavez’s claim, with 
Justice Thomas explaining for a plurality that it “does not violate the text of 
the Self-Incrimination Clause absent use of the compelled statements in a 
criminal case against the witness.”247 Because legal proceedings were never 
initiated against Chavez, he was not forced to incriminate himself in a 
“criminal case” and thus suffered no Fifth Amendment violation.248 Under 
Chavez, if police compel a password and search a phone but find no 
evidence, arrestees are seemingly without a remedy for the forced 
compulsion of the password. Individuals remain free to bring a civil-rights 
lawsuit based on a Fourth Amendment claim, but because most courts have 
held that searching a cell phone incident to arrest is lawful, any argument 
premised on the Fourth Amendment will currently fail.249 
In sum, the Fifth Amendment issues arising out of a police demand for 
an arrestee’s password raise complex and unresolved questions. An arrestee 
can make only a weak claim that complying with a police demand for a 
password violates the Self-Incrimination Clause because he will be unable to 
demonstrate the necessary element of compulsion. Even if his claim is viable 
as a purely legal matter, in practice it will rarely prevail. Most arrestees will 
have turned over their passwords voluntarily, and in other cases courts may 
incorrectly side with the government based on the foregone-conclusion 
doctrine. At bottom, arrestees likely have little or no self-incrimination 
protection against police demands for cell-phone passwords. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Password protecting your cell phone is undoubtedly a good idea. If the 
phone is lost, the password will help to protect the data. And if you are 
arrested, the password will make it more difficult for police officers to search 
the phone incident to arrest. But password protecting the phone will not 
necessarily prevent the police from bypassing the password and conducting 
a warrantless search of the phone. As a legal matter, password protecting the 
phone provides virtually no additional protection against police searches of 
cell phones incident to arrest. Longstanding caselaw permits police to 
attempt to open locked containers when searching incident to arrest, and by 
analogy, police are able to attempt to access the contents of a password-
 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 764. 
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 248. Id. at 766. 
 249. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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protected phone. Even if police cannot decipher the password on their own, 
they stand a strong chance of acquiring the password from simple police 
interrogation. Requesting a password requires police to give an arrestee 
Miranda warnings, but many individuals waive their Miranda rights and, in 
any event, violations of Miranda do not lead to suppression of evidence 
subsequently found. Arrestees likewise have little chance of successfully 
asserting a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim because police are not 
judicial officers and lack the authority to “compel” incriminating 
information in violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause. Moreover, because 
cell phones are often found on the person of an arrestee, police can bring 
them to the station, where computer-savvy officers can spend hours 
attempting to hack into the phone without first procuring a warrant. 
Police currently have wide latitude to search the contents of cell 
phones—including text messages, voicemails, photos, Internet browsing 
history, and reams of other data—when searching an arrestee incident to 
arrest. Given that password protecting the phone does little to curb this 
police power, the Supreme Court and legislatures should undertake efforts 
to scale back the ability of law enforcement to search digital devices incident 
to arrest.250 
 
 250. See Gershowitz, supra note 1, at 45–57 (suggesting potential legislative and judicial 
solutions). 
